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The influence of the political transformation in Russia on the Russia-EU
relations.

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1. Introduction

Modern system of international relations became more chaotic in the last decade¹: the hegemony of the USA isn't that stable anymore, it can't control all the crucial processes in world politics, for example, Iran is still getting closer to the status of the nuclear power despite the USA's efforts. The decline in the USA power made a rise of other countries possible².

China, Japan, Russia, Iran and many other states joined a race for the title of a regional power³. The lack of the governance in world politics became the reason for a randomization of international processes.

The randomization of processes in international relations converted a sphere of world politics into a 'terra incognita', where the behavior of an actor couldn't be fully foreseen by liberal theories of world politics. The liberal paradigm was transformed by the randomization as well: the democratic states had started being militant, the countries which publicly stood for liberal and democratic values had started applying them for their own benefit using the existing norms in world politics as a tool.

I believe that the trend of the randomization (chaotization) in the system of international relations is on the rise, that's why I've decided to use a neorealist approach in my research, it allows me not to plunge into the values, norms and constructs, but to pay attention towards the realization of interests.

Nonetheless, when we try researching a values-based factor in relations, we're going to have lots of materials, opinions and official documents about the

¹ Lavrov, Sergei, 'The Present and the Future of Global Politics', *Russia in Global Affairs* Vol. 5 #2 2007, p.9

² Clinton, Hillary, 'Foreign Policy Address at the Council on Foreign Relations, U.S. Department of State, <<http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/july/126071.htm>>, [accessed 19 May 2013].

³ The term "regional superpower" means that this actor in International Relations has an ability to control, to influence the international economical and political processes in its areas of interest, areas near its border

principles and values, so we'll have to be rather discreet, when we analyze these documents through the lens of the neorealism.

Also, we'll need to pay an additional attention to the European Union, because it's a complex phenomenon in the theory of international relations, which couldn't be easily described. That's why we'll have to add a conceptual theoretical framework allowing us to explain the nature of the EU.

Since we've determined the paradigm and the context of international relations, we can proceed to the next step of the research - in this dissertation we're going to focus on the complexity of processes in world politics which constitute Russia-EU relations.

There're many factors that influence the structure of these relations, some of them have an economic nature, for example, a situation with the EU's Third Energy Package⁴, and some factors have their root in the bilateral relations with the member-states - we can recall Russian-Polish tensions⁵, there are many other factors which have a complex nature – both powers fight against terrorism⁶ using the economic and political tools; all of these factors influence the level of relations.

However, a subject matter of the dissertation has a close connection to an internal policy of the Russian Federation, which also holds the important role in these relations. The subject matter of the research is the factor of normative power in these relations.

I'm rather interested in normative factors in the world politics, especially when it comes to the study of my own country's relations. I chose that subject

⁴ Romanova, Tatyana, 'Energy security without panic', Russia in Global Affairs, 7 October 2012, [Online], <http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/Energy_Security_Without_Panic-14900>, [Accessed 10 May 2013]

⁵ EUobserver: EU and Russia tackle thorny issues at Samara summit, 18.05.07, [Online], <<http://euobserver.com/foreign/24088>>, [accessed 19 May 2013].

⁶ Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the European Union: Fight against transnational crime and terrorism, <<http://www.russianmission.eu/en/fight-against-transnational-crime-and-terrorism>>, [accessed 19 May 2013]

matter because I believe that the view I'm going to present in this scientific research will bring a new point of view into the ongoing discussion.

My personal scientific interest lies at an intersection of the international relations science and the political science, moreover, it coincides with the field of the research: my bachelor's political scientist background helps me to study the political transformation in the Russian Federation, and my master's 'European Studies' background allows me to do the main part of the research concerning the world politics science and the European Union.

The topicality of the research is determined by growing tensions between the EU and Russia, the relations between neighbors and at the same time notable powers are of the utmost importance.

The EU and Russia share a history, their economic system are intertwined⁷, both actors are interdependent, still the tensions are arising.

In the middle of that collision lies is a question of the strength of EU's normative power. The normative side of these relations became have taken its place in a dialogue between the EU and Russia, so it is important to study its role in the relations: its ability to influence these relations, to shape them or to stumble them.

My dissertation aims to measure the normative factor of Russia-EU relations, specifically, the influence of the political transformation in Russia on the relations.

However, the primary goal of the research can't be achieved if we don't complete the following goals:

- We need to understand the nature of the European integration project.
- We need to analyze the system of international relations.

⁷ Barysch, Katynka, 'Russia, realism and EU unity', Centre for European Reform, [Online] <
http://www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/2011/policybrief_russia_final_20july07-800.pdf >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

- We need to explore the EU's foreign policy.
- We should understand the behavior of Russia in international relations.
- We should analyze the political transformation in contemporary Russia.
- We have to determine the efficiency of EU's application of normative power in the relations between Russia and the EU.
- We must predict the role and the place of normative power in the future of the relations we study.

The foundational hypothesis of this dissertation is the following proposition: 'The internal political transformation in Russia is an authoritarian one. That fact of Russia's authoritarian transition is very convenient for the European Union, because it gives a 'legitimate' reason for the EU to lay pressure on Russia using normative power, which is based on the EU's intergovernmental structure of consensus between the member-states. The concern of the EU with contemporary Russian political transformation is a tool. With that normative tool the EU tries to influence the development of Russia; however to a discontent of the EU, in this case normative power cannot be easily deployed, which causes tensions in relations and might serve as the stumbling block in Russia-EU relations in the future.'

To complete the afore-cited tasks, achieve the aim and to prove/disapprove the hypothesis I'm going to use an additional set of theories, to study the different parts of these relations:

We'll apply the liberal intergovernmentalist approach as a theory explaining the development of the integration project – the EU. In general, it the neorealist paradigm, because it focuses on the negotiations between the states and criticizes the neo-functionalist approach. Without the understanding of the EU's nature we won't be able to explain its behavior in international relations.

In order to comprehend political processes in contemporary Russia, we'll have to adopt the elitist theory. That theory allows us to evade a bias, because for a

citizen of Russian Federation it is a complicated task to evaluate the political transformation in the country he lives on.

Both of these theories have a similar foundation - they're explanatory models, free of normative constituent, so we we'll be able to produce an explaining model, which consists of concordant theoretical frameworks.

2. Russia and the EU in international relations.

2.1 The European Union as an integration project.

The first question that we need to answer is the question concerning the nature of the European Union. Because without an understanding of the theme we won't be able to comprehend the EU's behavior in international relations, its motives and drivers and; we won't be able to fit the EU's theoretical framework into the main paradigm.

The European Union is a unique actor on the world stage. It is a pioneer in the sphere of the supranational integration, which explains us a lot about the object of the research – the scientists, trying to cover all the knowledge of integration, have only one successful object to study. Integration projects in Latin America are numerous, but they're not that advanced and long-living; and post-soviet integration projects, for example, “the Union State of Russia and Belarus” are fictive and have no real supranational nature⁸.

And I tend to think that there's an explanation for the uniqueness of the situation. Firstly, the originality of the conditions in which the project ‘was born’: no other part of the world has suffered such an enormous amount of destruction in the period of 30 years (the beginning of the First World War in 1914 and the end of the Second World War's warfare in Europe in 1945). A population loss, a destruction of the infrastructure⁹, factories, farms, roads and the biggest European cities, a Soviet occupation of the Eastern and Central Europe and a ghost of a new

⁸ Shorshorov, Sergei, ' Draft Constitutional Act is 99% ready', Portal of the Union State, [Online] < <http://soyuz.by/en/?guid=93291> >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

⁹ Pilisuk M., Achord J., 'Who benefits from global violence and war: uncovering a destructive system', [Online] , Greenwood Publishing Group. p.136 < http://books.google.ru/books?id=r9kNZrmG0E8C&pg=PA136&dq=&hl=en&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false > - "Who benefits from global violence and war: uncovering a destructive system", [accessed 19 May 2013]

upcoming war – these were the reasons for the leaders of the founder states to reconsider the previous strategies, concerning each other.

After the World War II the USA had “covered” its allies with its military shield, which allowed the European states to focus on the economic growth¹⁰, freeing it from a participation in an arms race.

However, Western Europe still had an unresolved conflict which was threatening to undermine all the attempts to save the peace on that part of the continent – the production of the steel and coal in disputed territories.

The beneficial way for the states to resolve the situation (especially for France and the Federal Republic of German, which were weak after the end of the WWII) wasn't to wage another war, but to find a peaceful solution¹¹ – The European Coal and Steel Community provided an excellent resolution, that was expedient to the states. The decision to renounce a part of their sovereignty wasn't an easy one to the member-states, however it was rational. A state's survival is preferable to the state's destruction.

The latter development of the EU confirmed the way of the integration and the main reason for it. The states in Europe were negotiating about the new 'rules' until the rules became suitable for everyone; the development of the European Union (European Communities) could be explained as the movement of the states towards their own benefit in terms of the agreed common norms¹².

So, we must state that the development of the EU's institutions occurs when the states find a consensus-solution, and when there's no such a solution – there is no further integration.

¹⁰ "Who benefits from global violence and war: uncovering a destructive system". Marc Pilisuk, Jennifer Achord Rountree (2008). Greenwood Publishing Group. p.138. ISBN 0-275-99435-X

¹¹ [accessed 19 May 2013]

¹² Andrew Moravcsik, 'The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht', Ithaca: Cornell University Press; published in the UK by UCL Press, London, December 1998., p.4

The consensus about the human rights originates from the terror of the First and Second World Wars, which had shown the jeopardy from the non-democratic states. The non-democratic states were much more aggressive than democratic ones, their behavior was much more unpredictable. The fact of existence of these states carried a potential threat to the democratic states, so the European leaders 'learned their lesson' - it's much easier and safer to build relations with democratic states.

The important part of the integration is the normative base of the EU. All the states-members of the EU agree on the role of fundamental rights, their importance and the need of them to be spread, which is confirmed in the EU's Treaties¹³. Because all the states share that point of view – this normative element found its way into the European institutions, which soon took a role of defenders of these rights and also supervisors of rules of the 'game', according to which the European state behave.

I preferred the liberal intergovernmentalist model, because of its great explanatory ability concerning a development of the integration and the role of nation-states in it (though I can't absolutely agree with Moravcsik's focus only on some big EU states¹⁴), the role of the institutions as supervisors and of the 'fair game' inside and outside the EU, the very idea of possible 'reverse' movement of the project. Also the liberal intergovernmentalist approach, as a 'middle-level' theory seems to blend perfectly with a 'high-level' neorealism.

Now, when the theory is applied, we need to give an evaluation of the current state of affairs in the integration project. A pace of integration is in a decline since

¹³ 'Treaty of Lisbon', Official Journal of the European Union C 306, 17.12.2007, art.1-2, [Online] < http://bookshop.europa.eu/is-bin/INTERSHOP.enfinity/WFS/EU-Bookshop-Site/en_GB/-/EUR/ViewPublication-Start?PublicationKey=FXAC07306 >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

¹⁴ Wallace, Helen., 'Piecing the integration jigsaw together', Journal of European Public Policy 6:1 March 1999, [Online], < <http://www.princeton.edu/~amoravcs/library/ejpp.pdf> >, p. 160. [accessed 19 May 2013]

the failure with the 'European Constitution' in 2004, a financial crisis has slowed an economic development of the EU¹⁵.

The Treaty of Lisbon is rather controversial, after the Constitutional project it doesn't look like a serious breakthrough: the member-states have decided not to push the integration further, looking for a way to solve the problems without the EU; still, the foreign affairs received an expansion – the European External Action Service managed by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. However, when we look upon the person, who was chosen as the High Representative and the credentials that she and the EEAS have, we can say that it was another trade-off between the states.

Currently, the European Union is in the situation that could be characterized as 'an integration hitch' caused by the states' struggle with each other: France and Germany are fighting for the image of 'Future Europe'¹⁶, presenting the models of the EU's development, which suit their needs; the European Commission is mostly passive and concentrated on its direct responsibilities – the situation that absolutely fits the liberal intergovernmentalist approach.

So, we can sum up the researched data concerning the nature of the EU, and respectively its behavior on the world stage. The European Union is a complex, unique kind of supranational actor based on the world stage, it is basically led by the consensus of the member-states and their shared agreement concerning the wide sphere of questions. The integration occurs when the member-states find the benefits of the further integration more 'lucrative' than the status quo and are able to find a solution they all agree on. On the world stage the EU is represented both by the nation-states and the European Institutions (or the nation-states alone, if the

¹⁵ 'Economic Crisis in Europe: Causes, Consequences and Responses', EUROPEAN ECONOMY 7 | 2009, < http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication15887_en.pdf >

¹⁶ Volkery, Carsten., 'Poisoned Atmosphere: France and Germany at Odds ahead of EU Summit', Spiegel Online, [Online], < <http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/france-and-germany-struggle-to-find-common-ground-ahead-of-eu-summit-a-862009.html> >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

EU isn't allowed to act)¹⁷, where the leading role in questions concerning the trade questions, environment, and human rights belongs to the EU itself, because it represents the nation states' agreement on the importance of these rules in the sphere of international relations.

When we speak about the highest level of politics – the international level, we tend to agree, that the European Union sometimes acts independently or, in other words, its interests contradict interests of some member-states. We need not to rush into conclusions, because there is no collision within the theory we're using: all the states that constitute the EU have their own interests and sometimes their behavior might be egoistic, they may even try to 'cheat', to avoid following the norms for a benefit¹⁸, for example the Meseberg Initiative of Russia and Germany, it was rather progressive in the sphere of European security, but it was a bilateral initiative, not the EU's preposition, that is why the Initiative was left out.

Nonetheless, there is nothing 'wrong' with that kind of states' behavior according to the theoretical framework, because all the actors pursue their own aims in the first place. However, we must admit that some decisions are compulsory for some of the member-states, even if they contradict their interests, because of the majority vote and co-decision principle¹⁹ and the supremacy of the European Court of Justice.

The process of the chaotization (randomization) in the system of international relations shown that the European Union could still be 'avoided' by the member-states if they want to achieve something²⁰ that contradicts the common interest,

¹⁷ 'The European Union and the WTO', The WTO web-site, [Online], < http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/european_communities_e.htm >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

¹⁸ 'Quiet diplomacy to solve the Transnistria conflict', Deutsche Welle, [Online], < <http://dw.de/p/1511c> >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

¹⁹ 'Summaries of EU legislation: Qualified Majority', Official website of the European Union, [Online], < http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/glossary/qualified_majority_en.htm >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

²⁰ 'Quiet diplomacy to solve the Transnistria conflict', Deutsche Welle, [Online], < <http://dw.de/p/1511c> >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

common ground. However that process has the other side of the medal – the more the states try to break the rules, the weaker is their representative, the EU.

In this part of the research we've studied the European Union as an integration project. We've applied the liberal intergovernmentalist approach to the history of the EU and we've come to the next conclusions: that the European Union itself is a result of rational choices made by the member-states, the EU is a living consensus (and sometimes a compromise), between the EU-states, it is a supervisor of the established rules of the game and its protector.

2.2 The system of international relations, its characteristics.

In that part of the research we'll study the system of international relations, we'll apply the neorealist approach towards it and try to classify the main definitions of the theory.

We'll need a logical link between the parts of the research, so we'll briefly start with the EU's peculiar characteristics, trying to explain its behavior and to connect its history of integration with foreign politics.

The European Union could be studied as an actor in international relations, but not a classic nation-state actor, because of its unique structure it has some unique traits in its behavior, however the EU's still fits into the realistic point of view on world politics:

- The EU tries to protect its own interests
- The EU is promoting its agenda on the world stage gaining a benefit from it²¹

For the European Union there is no “national interest”, but it has the ‘common interest’ of the states, constituting the Union. The common interest isn’t that ‘solid’ in comparison with the national interest, however it has a sufficient basis to rely on, as we’ve found out in the earlier part of the research.

The promotion of own agenda is profitable, because it allows the actor to create a biased ‘rules of the game’ in the structure of the international relations, that is the reason that's why the actors on the world stage are promoting their own agenda – to create a space in international relations, where the rules favor the creator. The EU isn't an exception from the rule.

²¹ 'China ratches up solar dispute with WTO claim', GreenTech web-site, [Online], < <http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/china-ratchets-up-solar-dispute-with-wto-claim> >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

For example, the European Union is a strong promoter of a green agenda²², it suits the interests of the developed states constituting the EU²³, because they have highly-developed industries that do not endanger the ecological balance of Earth; and the developing states are not eco-friendly, so the promotion of the green agenda is profitable for the developed states, especially for those which constitute the European Union²⁴ and harmful for the developing countries, because it undermines their pace of the development. We'll return to the theme of a normative power later, because now it seems to be a sufficient explanation of the similarities between the EU's and a classic state's behavior.

Still, the European Union lacks of military forces, because most of the member-states prefer to leave the question of the security to the NATO²⁵, being NATO-members; while the EU force consists of nation-members forces; that fact leaves the EU in a very 'uncomfortable situation'²⁶. To explain the uneasiness of the situation, I'll have to dedicate some time to theoretical framework of the neorealism and its main definitions, in order to leave the text without the theoretical discrepancies.

The strength of the actor in international relations consists of powers, the majority of the neorealists would agree with me on that case, that there are two fundamental powers constituting the strength; hard power and soft power.

²² 'EU Green Diplomacy Network', European Union External Action, [Online],

< http://eeas.europa.eu/environment/gdn/index_en.htm >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

²³ 'China files dispute against the EU and certain member states', The WTO web-site, [Online],

< http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news12_e/ds452rfc_05nov12_e.htm >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

²⁴ 'China ratches up solar dispute with WTO claim', GreenTech web-site, [Online],

< <http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/china-ratchets-up-solar-dispute-with-wto-claim> >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

²⁵ Lawrence, Tony., 'THIS HOUSE BELIEVES EUROPEAN NATO MEMBER GOVERNMENTS SHOULD SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCE THEIR ARMED FORCES', IDEA web-site, [Online],

< <http://idebate.org/debatabase/debates/politics/house-believes-european-nato-member-governments-should-significantly> >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

²⁶ Nato chief: EU soft power is 'no power at all', EU Observer, [Online], < <http://euobserver.com/defence/120046> >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

Hard power is a traditional indicator of actor's strength, for a long time in a theory of international relations it bore a similar definition to 'state's strength'²⁷. The hard power gained a distinct definition after a term 'soft power' was invented.

When we speak about hard power of a state we imply its use of direct measures towards another state:

- A state's amount of a field in the force, an experience of the army, a history of successful army's operations and its reserve.
- A level of technological development of the arms the state possess and a size of military spending in the budget.
- An especially important part of the state's military - the nuclear, that factor has a great value, because it significantly raises the stakes of any war and guaranties its security from the traditional ways of waging war.
- An economic & financial strength of the state, its self-sufficiency, a pace of economic system's development.

All these particular features of hard power constitute the defensive potential of an actor on the world stage, without them the actor might be considered weak, so his interests won't be taken into consideration and even his sovereignty may be questioned by other actors.

However, the times are changing and the development of the system of international relations continues; we won't spend much time explaining all changes that occurred, but we'll have to state that the time of 'World Wars' is over – the nuclear weapons guarantee the safety of some actors²⁸, so these actors are doing

²⁷ Wilson, Ernest J., 'Hard Power, Soft Power, Smart Power', *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 616: pp. 110-124., [Online],
< <http://www.ernestjwilson.com/uploads/Hard%20Power,%20Soft%20Power,%20Smart%20Power.pdf> >,
[accessed 19 May 2013]

²⁸ Arbatov, Alexei., 'Real and Imaginary Threats', *Russia in Global Affairs*, 15 april 2013, [Online],

their best trying to prevent a proliferation of nuclear weapons, to secure their own safety and domination on the world stage, the weaker states aren't interested in war with nuclear powers.

Also, a role of economic tools is on the rise, a process of globalization had a direct impact on the contemporary system of international relations²⁹. The states became more interdependent, with their economic systems tied to each other. A development of the second dimension of the world politics has been accelerated - an economic & financial level of the world politics became an inseparable part of foreign affairs, so the economic strength of actors gained some weight and changed their behavior.

There are lots of economic measures available to modern actors starting from typical economic sanctions (and their targeted equivalents) and ending with embargoes. They're aimed to maim an economic strength of another state, in the contemporary world, where an economic power is considered to be the one of the main pillars of the state - an enemy who is able to destroy that pillar is a dangerous one.

In 1973 a huge oil crisis occurred, it was caused by the collusion of the Arabian states. The Arabian states had created the OPEC, an organization, which became a ground for negotiations between them concerning the questions of oil, its price and a production capacity of the states. The reason for a creation was simple - the Arabian states wanted to punish the USA for the support of the Israel in the Six-Day war³⁰.

< <http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/Real-and-Imaginary-Threats-15925> >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

²⁹ Dubinin, Sergei., 'And Still It Turns – Around Money', Russia in Global Affairs, 15 april 2013, [Online],

< <http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/And-Still-It-Turns--Around-Money-15924> >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

³⁰ Hakes, Jay., ' 35 Years After the Arab Oil Embargo', [Online],

<http://www.ensec.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=155:35yearsafterthearaboilembargo&catid=83:middle-east&Itemid=324 >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

That 'plot' had rather serious consequences: the USA suffered a jump of prices on oil³¹, an economic power of the USA was swayed, so was the economic strength of the part of the world that depended on the USA's economic system³². That case is an example of the high efficiency of economic hard power application.

There are other factors of hard power: a population of a state and its rise or decline, the territory of the state and its size - these factors have a direct impact on the state's hard power, nonetheless I'll restrict myself on that point, because in the system of contemporary world politics these factors are interdependent. The phenomenon of hard power relies on threats, applications of force towards the target or a possibility of it, the means could be either military or economic in their nature.

The sphere of international relations is constantly developing, the power is transforming as well, and soft power emerges. In short, soft power is a non-direct way to influence another state's decision making process: an ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes one wants through attraction rather than coercion or payment(c)³³. There could be some controversies concerning a definition of the term, however I think that the most common term, that I've just given, will be sufficient for that work, because of the wide variety of methods which could be described as a 'not hard power' action.

An economic strength of a state could be used as a lure for another state. An economic attractiveness of the state is a serious strength, because it allows to allure another states to its side.

³¹ Horton, Sarah., 'The 1973 Oil Crisis', [Online],

< <http://www.envirothonpa.org/documents/The1973OilCrisis.pdf> > , [accessed 19 May 2013]

³² ' 1973-74 Oil Crisis', University of California, Berkeley: Slaying the Dragon of Debt, [Online],
< <http://bancroft.berkeley.edu/ROHO/projects/debt/oilcrisis.html> > , , [accessed 19 May 2013]

³³ Joseph S. Nye, 'Public Diplomacy in a Changing World', *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 616, *Public Diplomacy in a Changing World* (Mar., 2008), pp. 94-109, [Online],
< <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25097996> > , [accessed 19 May 2013]

A highly developed economic system serves as a bait to its owner: other states would prefer allying with that actor, because the trade partnership might be a serious investment into economic strength of both sides of the trade. It is far more preferable for a state to become a 'friend' of the other state with a powerful economy, than to become an unsuccessful competitor to it.

Also, the states with an undeveloped market could be an attractive economic partners to the states, which are looking for new markets for their economic agents, however there is a possibility for such 'weak' states - their economy becomes absolutely dependent on the 'stronger' states.

The European Union might serve as an example; the European Union has the Single Market, it is greatly developed and free of typical protectionist policies, it has more than 500 million consumers³⁴ - a great lure for other states indeed. The European Union's market attractiveness gives an upper hand in diplomatic negotiations, and the EU actively uses this allure - a number of states which have trade agreements with the Union is rising³⁵. The more European companies get an access to other markets, the stronger the economies of the member-states become, and consequently the EU's economic attractiveness becomes more powerful.

Another important category of soft power instruments is normative power³⁶. Normative power is an ability to change the target-state's behavior in international relations or its internal policy through the adoption of norms, the convergence of

³⁴ '20 Years of the Single Market', Official Web-site of the European Commission, [Online], < http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/20years/singlemarket20/ >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

³⁵ 'The EU Single Market: Bilateral and Bi-regional Negotiations', Web-site of the European Commission, [Online], < http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/ext-dimension/negotiations/index_en.htm >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

³⁶ Niemann A., McEwan-Fial S., Heck A.: . 'Normative Power Europe? The power of the EU in its Relation to the USA in the Policy Field of Counter-terrorism. Mainz Papers on International and European Politics, 2012/03. Mainz: Chair of International Relations, Johannes Gutenberg University, [Online], < <http://www.politik.uni-mainz.de/cms/Dateien/mpiep03.pdf> >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

law systems, the appeal to the fundamental human rights or other norms and the signing of declarative and law-binding documents³⁷.

This type of soft power is a very elusive subject because of several reasons: a liberal and an American neoconservative may claim that the phenomenon is a 'rightful' in its nature and we shouldn't questions motives for its application (usually normative power is used by the developed states with liberal and democratic values); a classical realist won't recognize normative power as a power, because it is secondary to the economic and military power and may only be looked at as an outcome of the previous actions; and a constructivist will see not normative power but a construct, an ideologeme, which doesn't necessarily require an actor, and consequently he'll miss a reason for an application of the power.

For a neorealist, normative power is an instrument, which helps an actor to achieve the goals, it is a flexible weapon which can be aimed either at an economic pillar of the competitor state, or at a political regime of the state, or even both. A very important distinction between economic sanctions and some manifestations of normative power is that in case of sanctions the actor (the aim to the application of power) neither accepts these sanctions willingly nor signs the document stripping its own strength, and these sanctions are the norms which are created for a short-run purpose, for a designated task; and normative power appeals to the fundamental norms and bilateral documents, it is adopted willingly by the 'pray'³⁸.

Basically, the roots of that power run deep into the egoistical and rational behavior of actors. To prove my point of view I'll pay my attention to the hypocrisy of world politics: nearly every actor in contemporary international

³⁷ Wilson, Ernest J., 'Hard Power, Soft Power, Smart Power', *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 616: pp. 110-124., [Online], < <http://www.ernestjwilson.com/uploads/Hard%20Power,%20Soft%20Power,%20Smart%20Power.pdf> >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

³⁸ Joseph S. Nye, 'Public Diplomacy in a Changing World', *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 616, (Mar., 2008), pp. 94-109, [Online], < <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25097996> >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

relations signs lots of legal documents, treaties and declarations, has a seat in the United Nations and appeals to 'democracy, freedom, human rights and etc.', however the situation with the afore-cited definitions is far from being ideal. The official commitment to these values doesn't necessarily means the real application of efforts, every 'big power' in international relations still has its own clandestine services, which violate these values and implement their state-given job.

The demonstrative example is the USA and the history with the Guantanamo Bay Detention Camp³⁹⁴⁰ and the war in Iraq⁴¹. The country that publicly states its position towards freedom, democracy and human rights and actively participates in contemporary world politics, being a superpower, doesn't follow the rules when a benefit from avoiding the norms is more advantageous.

To avoid accusations of 'americanophobia' I'll state that the other players on the world stage aren't better at all, and in a part concerning Russia's internal political transformation and behavior in international relations I'll show that Russia is no better than the USA, it just follows the same principles of 'realpolitik'.

Still, it might be somehow implausible, that a normative dimension of contemporary world politics has a real influence on the actors, and the reasons for a creation of yet another stage for the states to compete is unclear. The normative dimension of world politics is developing because of the states' desire to create another space of politics where they can lay pressure on other states; according to the neorealism it's only natural that the states are looking for the ways to influence other states, that's why in addition to politics and economic dimension - the normative dimension is formed.

³⁹ 'Army Now Says G.I. Was Beaten in Role', The New York Times, June 09 2005, [Online]
< <http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/09/world/army-now-says-gi-was-beaten-in-role.html> >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

⁴⁰ 'Red Cross Finds Detainee Abuse in Guantánamo', The New York Times, November 30 2005, [Online]
< http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/30/politics/30gitmo.html?_r=0 >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

⁴¹ Prados A., Katzman K.: 'Iraq-U.S. Confrontation: CRS Issue Brief for Congress', [Online],
< <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/9043.pdf> >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

The normative dimension can't be characterized as a homogenous one, there are two controversial tendencies: the unification trend and the regionalization trend.

The unification trend: it is represented by the United Nations and WTO - world-wide organizations that are composed of the majority of acknowledged states. The trend doesn't cover the whole system of international relations, because there are no superpowers that are able to subdue the other world to their will.

These organizations' legal fundament lies on the norms which liberals tend to name 'universal', however there is always a bias in such organizations and their rules. The United Nations has the most incredible bias - the United Nations Security Council, one of the most important structures in the UN, is a place where the constant members of the Council: the UK, the USA, France, China and Russia have a 'veto power' which gives them an advantage in a decision-making process⁴². The World Trade Organization relies on the free trade norms⁴³, it sounds fair from the first point of view, however a bias exists there too. In the 90s the USA 'pursued milieu goals aimed at strengthening international legality and institutions in ways that have respected its own domestic laws as well as its international legal obligations' (c)⁴⁴, the USA had an interest in establishing a predictable open international economic system, to implement that goal the USA needed to replace the GATT with a working international organization and add a normative mechanism settling different trade disputes. Enough to mention, that since the

⁴² Okhovat Sahar., 'The United Nations Security Council: Its Veto Power and Its Reform', CPACS Working Paper No. 15/1 December 2011, [Online],

< http://sydney.edu.au/arts/peace_conflict/docs/working_papers/UNSC_paper.pdf >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

⁴³ 'Understanding the WTO: What we stand for', The WTO web-site, [Online],

< http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/what_stand_for_e.htm >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

⁴⁴ Hamilton S. Daniel, 'The United States: A normative power?', CEPS Working Document No. 291/May 2008, p. 21, [Online], < <http://aei.pitt.edu/9320/2/9320.pdf> >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

establishment of the organization and the mechanism the USA have been one of the most active users of it⁴⁵.

That trend on unification of the normative space is profitable the states, which were the first to understand the importance of a new dimension in the world politics, these organizations are expanding in qualities and quantities and their normative base grows bigger, providing additional ways for the benefiteres to lay pressure on the others.

Some states are trying to create their own sub-spaces, where they influence the other states. These attempts vary widely in their achievements, however some of the actors have succeeded in their efforts. The European Union as a common will and the consensus of the European states serves as a great example, however we'll pay enough attention to the EU's normative power in the next part, confining ourselves to an example of Russia. The Eurasian Union is a planned integration project on the post-soviet space, that now is at the very 'young' phase - a customs union stage⁴⁶. The economic strength of Russia is much larger than even the combined strength of the other members of the customs union (and even in comparison to the other to-be members of the Eurasian Union), and the eradication of customs inside the integration project benefits Russia. The spread of the norms on the neighbor states with an appeal to the Soviet Union's looks very suspicious from the first sight, but when we research the rational motivation of the member-states, we'll see, that this integration project is a Russia's way to create a sub-space in the normative dimension of the world politics, Russia tries to structure the territories around itself trying to make a more predictable sub-system in the chaos of international relations, to become more powerful.

⁴⁵ 'DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: THE DISPUTES: Map of disputes between WTO Members', The WTO web-site, [Online], < http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_maps_e.htm?country_selected=USA&sense=c >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

⁴⁶ 'AGREEMENT ON FOUNDATION OF EURASIAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY (EAEC)', 10 October 2000, [Online], < <http://www.worldtradelaw.net/fta/agreements/eaecfta.pdf> >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

It is obvious that with 'the widest' definition of the soft power we've given, we should keep in mind that these types of soft power are quite common in the last two decades, and there are others soft power tools that might be used, however my classification aims to stress the most typical and the most frequent 'weapons' - an economical, a political and a normative dimensions of the soft-power, represented by the afore-cited types.

In this part of the research we've revised an international relations theoretical framework - the neorealist approach. We've applied the working model's dichotomy on hard power and soft power, described the interest concept regarding the EU, and we've examined the cases from the history of international relations in order to apply the explaining model.

Now, that we've completed the common theoretical part of our job and have defined our 'tools' for the research, we can proceed with the application of the theory to the relations between the EU and Russia.

2.3 The European Union as an actor on the world stage

In that part of the research we're going to study the EU's behavior on the world stage: we'll define the EU's strengths and weaknesses in international relations, examine the cases of EU's behavior and evaluate the efficiency of EU's foreign affairs.

The European Union as we've shortly stated before has nearly no military capacity - the member states are reluctant to find a common ground on that case, because there is no serious military threat to all the countries of the EU, and the 'guarding' umbrella of the NATO covers the majority of the European states. The Common Security and Defense Policy of the EU is not well developed, and the states tend to leave the questions of war to themselves.

That drawback makes the foreign policy of the EU quite complicated and creates a natural skew towards the use of economic hard power, which is powerful enough, however a lack of military power still strongly affects the image of the European Union in eyes of other actors.

The economic restrictive measures and related sanctions: the EU uses a wide variety of these methods, and an application of these measures occurs more often than the others⁴⁷. These methods rely on the EU's economic strength, which serves as a weapon in the EU's 'game' on the world stage.

The first and the most 'popular' restrictive measure is an economic and financial sanctions. They could be divided on many types: ban on export/import of production, ban on a provision of specific services, ban on payments and investments, the withdrawal of the tariff preferences⁴⁸ - a flexibility of an instrument is rather convenient for the EU, it allows the achievement of the aim without an unwanted economical damage to itself and to avoid the discontent of the member states which might have their personal interest contradicting the common interest represented by the EU.

The Iranian sanctions is a recent example of an application of the economic restricting measures. The economic restrictions were imposed on Iran because of the Iranian Nuclear program which collides with interests of the EU's member states (a curious fact: the two of the 'EU three' which tried to negotiate with Iran earlier are the states in possession of the nuclear weapons - the UK and France, the 'third' - Germany as we recall from the history wasn't allowed to develop the nuclear weapons).

⁴⁷ Lehne Stefan., 'The role of sanctions in EU foreign policy', Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, December 14, 2012, [Online] < [www.http://carnegieeurope.eu/publications/?fa=50378](http://carnegieeurope.eu/publications/?fa=50378) >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

⁴⁸ European Commission – Restrictive measures: Sanctions or restrictive measures', Official website of the European Union, spring 2008, [Online], < http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/sanctions/docs/index_en.pdf#2, page 5 >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

In the beginning of 2012 year the Council of the European Union came to a decision to apply a complex of measures to shake the Iranian economy: an embargo on Iranian oil was levied, a serious matter indeed - the Iranian part in the EU's oil import was around 20%, the assets held by the Iranian Central Bank were frozen and a ban on the import of gold and on sensitive dual-use goods and technology' was levied⁴⁹. We also should keep in mind that these sanctions were applied to the whole single market of the EU which was of the great importance to the Iran - the EU was one of the biggest Iran's trading partners⁵⁰.

It took 6 months for the sanctions to take their toll, the Iranian economy had been dramatically hit by the restrictive measure taken by the US and the EU⁵¹, however the Iranian regime survived after a devastating recession of the rial. The other criterion testifying on the efficiency of taken measures is a political course of the Iranian government - Iran still continues its nuclear 'research' despite the economical crisis.

However, a year and a half isn't an enough amount of time for the sanctions to reach their aim, for example, in the Myanmar's case it took 15 years for the sanctions to overcome a political resistance of the Myanmar's government⁵². So, the Iranian case isn't closed yet, and we are only able to make predictions concerning the efficiency of these measures.

It's time to look at a practice of soft power use. The European Union is an actor that heavily relies on normative power - the lack of the majority of other

⁴⁹ Council conclusions on Iran', Council of the European Union, 3142th FOREIGN AFFAIRS Council meeting Brussels, 23 January 2012, [Online], < http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/127446.pdf >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

⁵⁰ 'European Commission: Trade: Iran', Web-site of the European Comission, [Online], < <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/iran/> >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

⁵¹ Dughan S., Borger J.: ' Iran's currency hits all-time low as western sanctions take their toll', The Guardian, 1 October 2012, [Online]

< <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/oct/01/iran-currency-rial-all-time-low> >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

⁵² Gebert Konstanty., ' SHOOTING IN THE DARK? EU SANCTIONS POLICIES', European Council on Foreign Relations, Policy Brief, January 2013, [Online], < http://ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR71_SANCTIONS_BRIEF_AW.pdf >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

'weapons' forces the EU to actively use the remaining tools to pursue the common European interest⁵³. Also the other reason for such a behavior is a predetermination towards the development of the normative 'arms', which is expressed in a foundation of the Union⁵⁴. We've found out earlier that the European Union (Communities) was an extreme, necessary - these states had agreed to create their own sub-system in the system of international relations, to ease the tensions and to define the 'new rules of the game' through the deliberative process in that sub-system, so they constructed a new normative dimension in their European sub-system. That normative foundation grew stronger over the years as the states were becoming more comfortable with these rules.

The documents, the institutions which served to play the role of the system grew in numbers, the system developed in a fast pace. Soon the scientists studying the EU started questioning themselves - what if that normative foundation could be used as a power on the world stage, is it possible to use it that way, what are the possible consequences of it?⁵⁵

The term 'civilian power' emerged as a definition for a power of the EU that would appeal to the values of democracy, the rule of law, the idea of liberty, the human rights⁵⁶. However, these theoretical constructs were heavily biased - the EU in the eyes of these scientists was something like a progressive, pioneer force in the world, so the European Union is ought to use that power, it is a duty to spread the values, but not an ability. The concept of civilian power was heavily criticized in

⁵³ Tilley Ryan., 'Normative Power Europe and Human Rights: A Critical Analysis', POLIS Journal Vol. 7, Summer 2012, p 450 - 495, [Online]
< <http://www.polis.leeds.ac.uk/assets/files/students/student-journal/ug-summer-12/ryan-tilley.pdf> >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

⁵⁴ 'Treaty of Lisbon', Official Journal of the European Union C 306, 17.12.2007, art.1-2, [Online]
< http://bookshop.europa.eu/is-bin/INTERSHOP.enfinity/WFS/EU-Bookshop-Site/en_GB/-/EUR/ViewPublication-Start?PublicationKey=FXAC07306 >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

⁵⁵ Manners Ian., 'Normative Power Europe: The international role of the EU', The European Union between International and World Society, Panel 1D, 31 May 2001, p. 4 [Online],
< http://aei.pitt.edu/7263/1/002188_1.PDF >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

⁵⁶ Manners Ian., 'Normative Power Europe: The international role of the EU', The European Union between International and World Society, Panel 1D, 31 May 2001, p.6 [Online],
< http://aei.pitt.edu/7263/1/002188_1.PDF >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

80s by the realists⁵⁷, because of its inner inconsistency, that's why I'll avoid using it - the concept relying on values doesn't fit into my theoretical framework.

Also, as we've already cleared the question concerning the definition of normative power and the normative dimension of international relations, we'll continue with the most visual example of the EU's use of normative power.

The European Neighborhood Policy is a tool to guarantee 'quiet borders', it is aimed to enlarge the EU's influence over the neighbor states and ensure their stability. The ENP consists of three initiatives: the Eastern Partnership, the Union for the Mediterranean (formerly known as the Barcelona Process) and the Black Sea Synergy⁵⁸.

These three initiatives represent main areas of the EU's interest and cover a majority of neighboring countries, creating a ring of potentially friendly-controlled states, which have no possibility of entering the EU. The ENP is a complex of bilateral relations, so in fact it is an application of a well-known formula - divide and rule, the European Union leads a number of distinct dialogues⁵⁹, which doesn't allow these states to unite in order to stand for their ground leaving them one on one with the EU.

The European Neighborhood Policy is aimed at the member-states of the ENP, their political and economic course. The EU offers a privileged relationship, a very tempting offer indeed, which gives these states a chance to deepen an economic integration with the EU and receive other political benefits in the future, for example a visa-free travel. In exchange these states should commit to the

⁵⁷ Manners Ian., 'Normative Power Europe: The international role of the EU', *The European Union between International and World Society*, Panel 1D, 31 May 2001, pp. 7-8 [Online], < http://aei.pitt.edu/7263/1/002188_1.PDF >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

⁵⁸ 'What is the European Neighbourhood Policy?', *The official site of the European Commission*, [Online], < http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/policy_en.htm >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

⁵⁹ 'ENPI Information and Communication Support Project', *Neighbourhood Info Centre*, [Online], < http://www.enpi-info.eu/main.php?id_type=2&id=677 >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

values, represented by the EU⁶⁰: democracy and human rights, rule of law, good governance, market economy principles and sustainable development - which are called the common values.

The greater the commitment and the movement towards the EU's values, the bigger the 'reward' in that trade, after the review of the ENP program in 2010-2011, the EU put an additional emphasize on the principle of the trade 'more for more'⁶¹.

So, basically, the formula of the trade looks like this: the economic goods and bonuses in exchange for the adoption of the EU's rules of the game. The European Union uses its economic strength as an 'amplifier' for normative force, combining two types of a soft power in order to make them more efficient.

Most of the states around the EU, which have no possibility even in a distant future of joining the Union, are easily lured by the European Neighborhood Policy. Then they form close economic ties with the EU, they become dependent on the EU's market (which is of no surprise - the Single Market is the largest and the most developed market in the region⁶²), and in the future they may face a problem of losing their economic 'sovereignty'.

The other important feature of the program is that the EU's bureaucrats measure the ENP-states level of commitment⁶³, their success on the EU's given way. The European Union in fact harms their sovereignty, evaluating their progress, deciding the way of the country's development. We've already mentioned in the previous part of the research, that through a history of the EU's development

⁶⁰ 'The Policy: How does the European Neighbourhood Policy work?', The official site of the European Commission, [Online], < http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/howitworks_en.htm >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

⁶¹ 'What is the European Neighborhood Policy?', The official site of the European Commission, [Online], < http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/policy_en.htm >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

⁶² 'Border-free Europe (single market)', Official website of the European Union, [Online], < <http://europa.eu/pol/singl/> >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

⁶³ 'REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL establishing a European Neighbourhood Instrument', Official website of the European Union, Brussels, 7.12.2011, [Online], < http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/docs/2011_prop_eu_neighbourhood_instrument_reg_en.pdf >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

arose an agreement between the member-states concerning an instability and unpredictability of non-democratic states, this agreement represented by the EU still in the force and it lies in the fundament of the ENP.

The invention of that policy and its use allowed the EU to effectively lay pressure on the neighbor-states, binding them to the Union's will both using normative power and economic tools, however in the end the normative factor is dominant in the policy, because the ENP-states are undergoing a political transformation because of the norms they've signed up to.

An interesting moment from the history of the European Neighborhood Policy - Russia was given 'a chance' to join the program of the Eastern Partnership with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, however Russia was infuriated by that proposition, because Russian diplomats being rather realist (see the Russia's part of the research) had an apprehension of the ENP: they saw that the policy puts the states into an inferior position towards the EU, binds them, so the EU in perspective might ensnare them using the biased norms and economic tools. Russia refused the offer, preferring to stay on the equal footing with the European Union, and continued the common spaces program implementation.

In the end of this part, we should sum up the researched data to make some final conclusions concerning the EU's behavior on the world stage as an actor, representing the consensus of the member-states. The European Union because of its nature doesn't have a typical set of powers that nation-states possess, the lack of hard power leaves the EU in a very discreet situation⁶⁴, only a part of hard power and soft power tools is available to the EU: the economic measures and normative power methods to lay pressure on other states, and sometimes these tools are combined in order to get a stronger effect in foreign affairs. The European Union tends to be active using these measures in the last two decades, especial attention is

⁶⁴ , Nato chief: EU soft power is 'no power at all', EU Observer,06.05.2013, [Online], <<http://euobserver.com/defence/120046>>, [accessed 19 May 2013]

paid to the states around the EU or the states which might destabilize the contemporary system of international relations.

The European Union seems to be building its own sub-system of international relations, which is comfortable for the member-states, and suppresses other systems (for example, the EU's 'fight' for a future of Ukraine in the European sub-system collides with Russia's Eurasian integration project, still Ukraine is free to choose the side to 'ally' with). The values which lie in a fundament of the European consensus become a flexible tool for the Union and that's quite a realist behavior for such an unusual actor in international relations.

In that part of the research we've discovered that:

- the European Union has an incomplete set of power: the EU lacks of military power.
- because of that feature the EU heavily relies on economic and normative tools, the combination of different powers is usual in the EU's foreign policy.
- the EU is building the sub-system in international relations, a system where the EU is a normative and economic leader.

2.4 Russia's behavior in international relations.

In that part of the work, we're going to analyze the behavior of the Russian Federation on the world scene according to the theoretical framework of international relations, because without the understanding of Russia's motives, we won't be able to properly study the relations between Russia and the EU. We shall analyze Russia's actions and categorize them in accordance with the neorealist concepts.

The Russian Federation is different from the European Union, it is a classic nation-state actor, therefore it has a national interest, which we're going to study.

Russia's national interest is not that plain: the texts written in the official 'Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation', 'Russia's National Security Strategy' and other documents⁶⁵ is a good way to state Russia's intentions. However it is an official layer of international affairs, but in my opinion, Russia's real interest can be put in the following theses:

- Russia wants to restore its superpower status it once had during the Soviet period.

- Russia wants to secure its borders and a near neighborhood. That's why all the neighbors which decide to change their political course in foreign affairs are 'punished' by Russia for turning their backs.

To prove that point of view, we'll need to apply the theoretical framework and analyze the behavior of Russia in the recent past.

⁶⁵ 'Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation Approved by President of the Russian Federation V. Putin', the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 12 February 2013, [Online], <
http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/76389fec168189ed44257b2e0039b16d!OpenDocument >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

We've already mentioned such features of Russia's power as the possession of nuclear arms, the decline of population, the huge stock of natural resources, however we've not yet discussed economic instruments of the country.

Russia isn't afraid to use economic instruments in order to lay pressure on other states, usually the implementations of such sanctions happen when Russia has problems trying to achieve a goal through using the other means, there are plenty of cases, but the most vivid ones are the Gas War with Ukraine in 2005-2006 and the ban on Moldovan and Georgian wine in 2006.

Those examples show the length of Russia's commitment in pursuing its interests and they represent Russia's will to control the neighbor-states.

Roots of the conflict with Ukraine are purely political: till the Presidential elections in 2004 Russia and Ukraine had an agreement concerning the taxation of Russian natural gas through the Ukrainian territory and the price on natural for Ukraine, these agreements were quite 'friendly' in their nature. The price of gas, according to a contract between Gazprom (the state owned Russian company⁶⁶) and Naftogaz (the state owned Ukraine company⁶⁷), for Ukraine was extremely low⁶⁸ - 50\$ per 1000 cubic meters. The Kuchma's Ukraine and the Putin's Russia had no serious troubles in relations.

However the good relations between the countries came to an end in the end of 2004, when a color revolution in Ukraine occurred. The Orange Revolution resulted in a change of Ukrainian political elite - a pro-western group came to power, the new President Viktor Yushchenko stated his intentions to change the vector of foreign policy.

⁶⁶ 'Investors: Shares', Gazprom official web-site, [Online],
< <http://www.gazprom.com/investors/stock/> >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

⁶⁷ 'About Company', NaftoGaz of Ukraine web-site, [Online],
< <http://www.naftogaz.com/www/3/nakweben.nsf/0/3A25D65C2606A6C9C22570D800318869?OpenDocument> >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

⁶⁸ Pirani Simon, ' How Post-Soviet Transition and Economic Crises Shaped the Russo-Ukrainian "Gas Wars" ', paper for the PEEER seminar, Governing Energy in Europe and Russia, 3-4 September 2010, p.4 [Online],
< <http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/csgr/peer/warwick/pirani-text.pdf> >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

For Russia it was huge blow: Russia's expectations concerning Ukraine's foreign policy were belied. So the decision was made to punish Ukraine and to lay influence through the use of economic measures.

In March 2005 Gazprom announced its wish to review the previous prices on gas for Ukraine - Gazprom wanted to set the price on a market level - 160\$ per 1000 cubic meters in the next year⁶⁹.

It seems that the Ukrainian government was aware of the possibility of those measures from the Russian Federation - Ukraine agreed with the increase of price, insisting on a gradual increase of the price and on a rise of a transit tariff from 1\$ per 1000 cubic meters to 2,5\$. The negotiations were held since March till the end of the year, however the sides failed to come to an agreement⁷⁰.

Russia's attitude and rhetoric was quite plain: 'Now Ukraine is a European state, so why should it pay a lesser price, than other European states?', Vladimir Putin even stated that the previous agreement was in fact detrimental to Russia⁷¹.

A 'hot' stage of the gas conflict started on the first of January, when Gazprom stopped the delivery of natural gas to Ukraine and accused the Ukrainian side of stealing Gazprom's gas. Ukraine admitted the stealing of gas belonging to European countries, however the withholding of gas weren't stopped.

Russia's commitment to the 'hard' scenario was unprecedented: Russia put aside its economic relations with Europe trying to punish Ukraine, which led to drastic consequences - European countries started looking for alternatives⁷² to

⁶⁹ Gelb Bernard., ' Russian Oil and Gas Challenges: CRS Issue Brief for Congress', [Online], 3 January 2006, < <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/58988.pdf> >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

⁷⁰ 'Gazprom Says No Progress in Gas Talks with Ukraine', Kommersant Online, 20 December 2005, [Online], < http://www.kommersant.com/p-7807/r_500/Gazprom_Says_No_Progress_in_Gas_Talks_with_Ukraine/ >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

⁷¹ ' Expert: Ukraine vs Gazprom: the price of the problem', Regnum Info-Agency, [Online], < <http://www.regnum.ru/english/569483.html> >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

⁷² Lobjakas Ahto., 'EU Officials Upbeat On Prospects For Caspian Gas Link', Payvand Iran News, 23 November 2007, [Online], < <http://www.payvand.com/news/07/nov/1214.html> >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

Russia, in order to be safe in case of the Gas War continuation (and it continued few years later⁷³).

Russia's first goal was to punish Ukraine, and this goal was reached, however the chosen tactic of laying pressure on Ukraine wasn't successful, Ukraine turned away from Russia.

Oil and gas aren't the only economic instruments in Russia's possession; Russia's internal market is a notable weapon itself, and the Russian state used it in its foreign affairs with Georgia.

Another color revolution was the reason for a decline in Russia's relations with a neighbor country - the Revolution of Roses that took place in November 2003 in Georgia: the previous President Eduard Shevardnadze was forced to resign, and in the beginning of 2004 the new Georgian President was elected - Mikheil Saakashvili. He was a nationalist, pro-western politician. The membership in the EU and NATO were proclaimed as the main goals of his Presidency⁷⁴.

Though the previous Georgian President - Eduard Shevardnadze wasn't a staunch ally of Russia, he wasn't a western-oriented politician and Georgia's international interests weren't dramatically coinciding with Russia's foreign policy. During the Saakashvili's Presidency the relations considerably deteriorated, because Russia's place in a new Georgian strategy in the world politics was much more inferior to European one⁷⁵.

Russia started looking for a way to punish Georgia, in order to teach Georgia a lesson and to force it to put one's attention back to Russia's interests. The weakest link in Georgian economy was found soon - Georgia was highly dependent on

⁷³ 'Russia and Ukraine: history of the gas wars', The Telegraph, 1 November 2011, [Online], < <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sponsored/russianow/politics/8862357/Russia-Ukraine-history-gas-wars.html> >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

⁷⁴ Beatty Andrew., 'Caucasus to get the nod', The EU Observer, 26.01.04, [Online], < <http://euobserver.com/enlargement/14208> >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

⁷⁵ Beatty Andrew., 'Georgia sets out its European credentials', The EU Observer, 06.04.04, [Online], < <http://euobserver.com/enlargement/15081> >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

Russia's market: exports of Georgian wine into Russia accounted for 80% of all the export⁷⁶.

In March 2007 the Chief Sanitary Inspector of Russia Gennadiy Onishchenko publicly announced that Georgian and Moldovan wines did not comply with sanitary requirements⁷⁷ - in a major part of the imported production pesticides were found.

Moldova also received a ban on wine's export because of her pro-European political course⁷⁸, I presume that a signing of the Moldova-EU action plan served as a trigger for the ban⁷⁹. However in the Georgia-Russia relations, the Russian Federation expanded a list of sanctions, including a ban on Georgian mineral water⁸⁰, making the situation for Georgia even worse.

None of other European states or the neighbor-states of Georgia and Moldova took similar measures restricting the import of Georgian and Moldovan wine appealing to the unsatisfactory quantity of wine, that's an important evidence of Russia's will to punish those states: Rospotrebnadzor's⁸¹ ban on wine was a cover for Russia's intent.

The ban on import of wine and mineral water had serious consequences: the Georgia-Russia relations continued deteriorating even faster than before - until a logical bottom was reached - the war in South Ossetia occurred in 2008. Russia

⁷⁶ 'GEORGIA/RUSSIA: Georgian Wine To Return To Russia In Time For Summer', Georgian Wine Association, [Online],

< <http://www.gwa.ge/?3/492/> >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

⁷⁷ 'Concerning the import and selling of alcohol products', Rospotrebnadzor, Official letter №0100/3267-06-23, 25.03.2006, [Online], - Russian Source, <

http://rospotrebnadzor.ru/c/journal/view_article_content?groupId=10156&articleId=264352&version=1.0 >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

⁷⁸ 'EU/MOLDOVA ACTION PLAN', Official web-site of the European Union, 1 May 2004, [Online],

< http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action_plans/moldova_enp_ap_final_en.pdf >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

⁷⁹ 'Foreign Relations: European Integration', Republic of Moldova Official Website, [Online],

< <http://www.moldova.md/en/europa/> >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

⁸⁰ 'Russia Targets Borjomi in Trade War with Georgia', Civil Georgia, 5 May 2006, [Online],

< <http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=12495> >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

⁸¹ Federal Service for Supervision of Consumer Rights Protection and Human Welfare

managed to shake the Georgian economy: a Georgian wine market suffered a huge loss of income⁸², even though Georgia managed to redirect a part of the export into other countries, the largest trade-partner was lost.

Russian economic measures proven themselves to be partly successful: a serious dependence of the CIS-states (which Georgia and Ukraine both were at the moment of sanctions' application) on Russia made their economies vulnerable to Russia's economic sanctions, nonetheless the political output of these situation was quite worrisome for Russia - the states continued their 'drift' towards the European Union despite the measures taken against them.

The ban on Georgian wine served as another step towards an armed conflict between Russia and Georgia. Not only a pro-European vector of Mikheil Saakashvili's politics was irritating Russia, but also his nationalist rhetoric: Saakashvili stood for the unification of Georgia: Abkhazia, Adjara, South Ossetia and other regions should be returned under a Georgian jurisdiction, a territorial integrity have to be restored⁸³.

Russia had supported Georgian regions' will for the autonomy since the dissolve of the USSR, support for Abkhazia's government and South Ossetia's government was especially strong, because these territories saw Russia as their defense against Georgia and Russia was interested in having those republics as a means to control Georgia; a peacekeepers contingent was present on these territories⁸⁴

⁸² De Waal Thomas., 'Georgia's Choices: Charting a future in uncertain times', Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2011, p.18, [Online],

< http://carnegieendowment.org/files/georgias_choices.pdf >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

⁸³ 'Saakashvili's Vows Improvements with Drastic Measures', Civil Georgia, 25 January 2006, [Online],

< <http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=6090>>, [accessed 19 May 2013]

⁸⁴ King Charles., 'The Five-Day War: Managing Moscow After the Georgia Crisis', Foreign Affairs, December 2008, pp. 1-2, [Online],

< http://www9.georgetown.edu/faculty/kingch/King_Five_Day_War.pdf >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

Both countries were ready to start a warfare: the Georgian military enjoyed a notable budgetary part in the years before the conflict⁸⁵, US military experts participated in Georgia's army training⁸⁶; Russia also was ready, it stated an intention to defend a civilian population living in South Ossetia and Abkhazia if they are attacked⁸⁷.

The conflict erupted momentarily: the Georgian military launched an attack on South Ossetia⁸⁸ and a retaliation was swift. Russian military and peacekeepers had responded to the attack and launched a counter-attack to 'coerce the Georgian side to peace'⁸⁹. During the war Russian forces occupied a part of Georgia in order to lay pressure on the Georgian government. When Russian army made a significant progress in a counter-offensive - a cease fire was achieved. After the conflict Russia had its military on Georgian territory for a month, and garrisons were left in South Ossetia and Abkhazia⁹⁰.

The most important conclusion we can draw from that case is simple: Russia without a shade of doubt responded with an armed response - the Russian Federation had showed her commitment to apply hard power if it is necessary. An important result of this war was that Russia had proven her ability to resolve conflicts through the force.

Russia is much more a hard power actor, than a soft power one. We mentioned before, that Russia has been trying to construct a sub-system in

⁸⁵ 'Georgia - Military Spending', GlobalSecurity website, [Online],

< <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/georgia/budget.htm> >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

⁸⁶ Kimsey Doug., 'Training for Iraq Boosts Security in Caucasus', U.S. Department of Defense, [Online],

< <http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=16284> >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

⁸⁷ 'Russia vows to defend South Ossetia', BBC News, 5 August 2008, [Online],

< <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7543099.stm> >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

⁸⁸ 'Report: Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia', the Council of the European Union, September 2009, [Online], < http://www.ceiig.ch/pdf/IIFFMCG_Volume_I.pdf >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

⁸⁹ Nichol Jim., 'CRS Report for Congress: Russia-Georgia Conflict in South Ossetia: Context and Implications for U.S. Interest', 22 September 2008, p.7, [Online], < http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL34618_20080922.pdf >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

⁹⁰ 'RSS Russia: Russia fully staffs bases in Abkhazia, S.Ossetia', RIA NOVOSTI, 19 November 2008, [Online], < <http://en.rian.ru/russia/20081119/118400373.html> >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

international relations on the post-soviet space for the last two decades, which requires the application of normative power and other steps towards the establishment of a future soft power fundament were taken⁹¹.

But, generally, the behavior of Russia on the world stage shows that Russia still prefers a traditional set of instruments, based on hard power, and it seems that current Russian leaders don't have a full understanding of the concept of soft power⁹².

The Russian Federation is a traditional actor in the world politics, it relies on hard power instruments, whether they are economic or military, in the last decade Russia applied different sets of hard power measures to other countries. Nonetheless, our cases give us understanding that the application of hard power was at least partly successful: if we speak of a short-term period, we can say that Russia partly achieved its goals, if we think of a long-term period - Russia was losing its allies, the countries turned their backs on Russia.

Russia prefers hard power to soft power: there is a slight shift towards a development of soft power⁹³, however it's going to take some time for Russia to master the application of soft power.

Russia wants to restore its status of superpower it had during the Soviet period, therefore it acts pronto and tough, when its neighbors turn their backs on Russia and their interests collide with Russia's. These Russia's neighbors become

⁹¹ 'The Kremlin reinforces Russia's soft power in the CIS', EASTWEEK, 17 September 2008, [Online], < <http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/eastweek/2008-09-18/kremlin-reinforces-russias-soft-power-cis> >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

⁹² Lukyanov Fyodor., ' Why Russia's Soft Power Is Too Soft ', Russia in Global Affairs, 1 February 2012, [Online], < <http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/redcol/Why-Russias-Soft-Power-Is-Too-Soft-15845> >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

⁹³ Sharikov Oleg., ' Russian Soft Power Under Construction', e-International Relations, 14 February 2013, [Online], < http://www.e-ir.info/2013/02/14/russian-soft-power-under-construction/#_ftn18 >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

targets for Russia's hard power measures, also Russia doesn't ask for permissions to apply measures, it firstly acts and only after engages in a dialogue⁹⁴.

⁹⁴ King Charles., 'The Five-Day War: Managing Moscow After the Georgia Crisis', *Foreign Affairs*, December 2008, pp. 7-9, [Online], < http://www9.georgetown.edu/faculty/kingch/King_Five_Day_War.pdf >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

3. The factor of Russia's political transition in the relations between the EU and the Russian Federation.

3.1 Russia's internal political transformation

In that part of the research we're going to study a process of political transformation in the Russian Federation, in order to understand, if the EU's concerns about the development of democracy have a ground. That's the reason we're going to answer the following question:

- How could the political transformation in contemporary Russia be described?

So, we'll start with a short historic reference, which will provide us with an understanding of the processes lying in the fundament of the current transformation.

Russia's historical background is an uneasy one: in the 20th century Russia managed to survive in two World Wars, the Civil War and four revolutions. In December of 1991 Russia had its last radical change of political system, resulting in a new state entity - the Russian Federation, which became a legitimate heir to the Soviet Union⁹⁵.

The Russian Federation publicly committed to democratic and liberal values, hoping to become a part of the world society (in other words, the society of the developed countries) in a short period of time. However, the transition wasn't easy, Russia suffered a political crisis (also called 'Russian constitutional crisis') in

⁹⁵ ' Fall of the Soviet Union', The Cold War Museum, [Online],
< http://www.coldwar.org/articles/90s/fall_of_the_soviet_union.asp >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

1993⁹⁶, when legislative and executive (allied with President Eltsin) branches were engaged in a bloody confrontation striving for the power in the country. That dreadful struggle resulted in a victory of the President and the executive branch and a signing of the Russian Constitution, which became a foundation for a future transformation of the political regime. The legislative branch became less powerful, according to the new Constitution⁹⁷, and in the future became dependent on the President.

The importance of that shift of power that it will have serious consequences in the future - the elites which will hold that institution will have the stronger 'platform' and will have more tools to shape a political process in Russia.

The collapse of the USSR had also another crucial consequence - some subjects of the new Russian Federation declared their will for independence and sovereignty⁹⁸, 'the parade of sovereignties' phenomenon which included Republic of Tatarstan, the Chechen Republic, the Republic of Buryatia. The conflict between the federal power and local elites ignited momentarily and in 1994 the First Chechen War began. We'll return to Chechen Wars in a latter part of the research, however we'll need to note that 'the parade of sovereignties' and regional separatists' actions caused a federal authority to respond with the force. The federal authorities (the President and an executive branch of power) learned a lesson well: they started 'taming' regional elites, a basis for a future construction of the 'power vertical' was founded⁹⁹.

⁹⁶ Andrews Josephine., 'When majorities fail: the Russian Parliament, 1990-1993'. Cambridge University Press. p. 20., 2002, [Online],

< <http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/samples/cam033/2002071568.pdf> >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

⁹⁷ Chandler A., 'Presidential Veto Power in Post-Communist Russia, 1994-1998', Canadian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 34, No. 3 (Sep., 2001), pp. 487-516, [Online]

< <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3233001> >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

⁹⁸ Antonov M., 'Theoretical Issues of Sovereignty in Russia', NRU HSE. Publications: WP BRP Series: Law, M.: НИУ ВШЭ, 01/2012. - p.20, [Online],

< <http://spb.hse.ru/ius/theorylaw/publications/47333403.html> >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

⁹⁹ Sukhov Ivan. , 'The Power Vertical and the Nation's Self-Consciousness', Russia in Global Affairs, 15 June 2008, [Online], < http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/n_10931 >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

Such internal struggles resurrected the belief in a strong leader, who would be able to solve the problems using an 'iron hand' (or the strong hand, which is usually referred to J. Stalin's rule). Another reason for the increase of popularity of these ideas was the drastic economical crisis of 1998 (which caused a devaluation of the ruble); the dreadful condition of the economical system resulted in a serious rise of poverty and the nostalgia of the 'old and peaceful' soviet times, when the unemployment wasn't a national problem, became a strong catalyst which extended the social base for the idea of the 'strong hand' governor¹⁰⁰.

During that time we can see the rise of the political career of the future president - Vladimir Putin. There were many reasons explaining why he became the President - the agreement of the elites, the Russians' nostalgia for a strong leader, the work of image-makers. In this research we tend to agree with the leading role of the political elite, however other factors should be taken into account too: without people's votes Putin couldn't have won so many elections in one tour.

In 2000 on the 7th of May Vladimir Putin became President with a landslide victory. I chose this historical event as the turning moment in Russia's recent history, because Putin has drastically changed the course of the country's development. Many contemporary political scientists agree, that Putin's ascension to power is directly connected with the rise of the authoritarian tendencies in Russia¹⁰¹: because Putin's authority has considerably increased since his coming to power, and the political system was reformed during his leadership¹⁰².

¹⁰⁰ Dalziel Stephen., 'Russia's love affair with strong leaders.', BBC News, 12 March 2004 , [Online], < <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3506312.stm> >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

¹⁰¹ von Eggert Konstantin., 'The obedience of masses turns into the indifference towards its fate during the crisis', Kommersant FM, 26.04.2013, [Online], < <http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2178971> >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

¹⁰² Pavlovsky Gleb., 'Nad Putinim vsegda budet vitat vopros, kto za nim stoit...', Business-Online: Tatarstan's business e-newspaper, 12.12.2012, [Online], < <http://www.business-gazeta.ru/article/71728/> >, [accessed 19 May 2013]/

Putin inherited a rather complicated legacy after Eltsin's withdrawal from the Presidential post; the country had serious benefits in international relations comparing to the other post-soviet states, however it had serious problems, which had a potential to undermine Russia's position in world politics.

Russia had an enormous stockpile of nuclear weapons received from its predecessor - the Soviet Union. That strategic stock guarantees the territorial safety, because no one would like to start the third world war¹⁰³ because it's going to be a game with a zero sum for all sides of a conflict. Nuclear arms provide Russia with an amount of hard power in international relations.

Another source of Russia's hard power is its huge amounts of the natural resources, starting from a timber wood and a fresh-water, ending with the enormous deposits of oil¹⁰⁴, natural gas and other resources. The possession of these strategic resources gives Russia an upper hand in economic relations, however there is the other side of the medal - other actors tend to perceive Russia as a raw materials appendage¹⁰⁵, that fact bears a serious threat to position of the country once these resources start to wane.

Russia's big territory gives it a great advantage - Russia is a European and Asian regional power at the same time¹⁰⁶. Russia stays in two vital areas of modern international affairs: the European and the Pacific stage, so the country is involved at two key regions of world politics.

¹⁰³ 'Confrontation over Pristina airport', BBC News, 9 March 2000, [Online],

< <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/671495.stm> >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

¹⁰⁴ 'Country Analysis Brief Overview: Russia', Independent Statistics & Analysis by U.S. Energy Information Administration, 18 September 2012, [Online],

< <http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=RS>>, [accessed 19 May 2013]

¹⁰⁵ Judah Ben., 'Why Russia is not losing Siberia', European Council on Foreign Relations, 30 January 2013, [Online],

< http://ecfr.eu/blog/entry/why_russia_is_not_losing_siberia >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

¹⁰⁶ Bordachev T., 'Russia is too big to choose between Europe and Asia', Valdai Club, 11.07.2011, [Online], < http://valdaiclub.com/russia_and_the_world/46040.html >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

Russia's foreign policy is under absolute Presidential jurisdiction according to the Constitution¹⁰⁷. So the President has a direct control of foreign affairs, he is an ultimate representative of a national interest. The Presidential position grants carte blanche to a 'Presidential' political elite.

Still, the population of Russia continued to decrease in a fast pace, threatening to sap the workforce market in the future¹⁰⁸. The forecasts seem to vary, however for a state it's a serious threat to its power, without a growth of population an economic development may stumble upon a lack of workforce and military.

Russia was familiar with classical state-vs.-state confrontations, however, Russia wasn't able to respond properly to modern challenges such as drug and human trafficking, terrorist attacks, cyberattacks and other threats, which had an international nature¹⁰⁹.

Another problem is connected with Russia's neighborhood, which is wide and very complex due to Russia's size: Russia shares the border with the European Union, Japan and China another solid powers in the system of International Relations, which causes tensions - superpowers dislike to have other superpowers in the neighborhood, plus Russia has unsolved territorial disputes with some strong states¹¹⁰.

¹⁰⁷ ' THE CONSTITUTION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION', the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 12 December 1993,[Online],
< <http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/ns-osndoc.nsf/1e5f0de28fe77fdcc32575d900298676/d0bd6a5ba542c949c32575dd004009ee!OpenDocument> >,
[accessed 19 May 2013]

¹⁰⁸ Haub Carl., ' The BRIC Countries', Population Reference Bureau, April 2012, [Online],
< <http://www.prb.org/Articles/2012/brazil-russia-india-china.aspx> > , [accessed 19 May 2013]

¹⁰⁹ ' 2012 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Country Reports - Afghanistan through Costa Rica: ', U.S. Department of State, 7 March 2012, [Online]
< <http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2012/vol1/184098.htm> > , [accessed 19 May 2013]

¹¹⁰ Ilyashenko Andrei., ' Territorial dispute hinders Russian-Japanese rapprochement', Russia Beyond the Headlines, 5 July 2012, [Online],
< http://rbth.ru/articles/2012/07/05/territorial_dispute_hinders_russian-japanese_rapprochement_16145.html > ,
[accessed 19 May 2013]

In 2000, by the first time Vladimir Putin became the President of the Russian Federation, the country was standing on a crossroad, the weakening and strengthening trends were both on the rise, a Gordian Knot of which had to be untied.

Vladimir Putin wasn't an independent candidate, he was a representative of the elite, the Eltsin's elite, which wasn't rather homogenous, but consisted of three distinctive parts: the 'siloviki' (an army's and former-KGB elite), the Eltsin's family and the oligarchs. These groups had different values, origins and purposes, however they all were had to share the authority, so the consensus person to seal the political dead was found - Vladimir Putin: an 'official' heir to Boris Eltsin, the previous President, who had strong ties both with Eltsin's friends and oligarchs, such as Boris Berezovsky¹¹¹, also he was a former KGB agent, so his person was met with enthusiasm.

An important note we need to state: we're using an elite theory's framework, so we're talking about the fact of coming into power of one elite group and a process of suppression against counter-elites. The concept of struggle between elites is a core concept in that part of the research, because it explains the main motivation in political field which leads to a transformation of a political system. Another reason to choose an elitist approach is its' fairness in questions concerning a behavior of actors - as we're constructing a multi-level theory, we need to choose a framework, which relies on the same basis of behavior - an egoistical, rational-driven behavior, because we're building a theoretical framework free of values, where we tend to study the interests of actors on different levels, the realpolitik.

So, the ruling elite in the beginning of Putin's presidency was consolidated by the person in power, however the elite didn't feel rather secure and started fortifying its positions very soon.

¹¹¹ Baker P., Glasser S.: 'Kremlin Rising: Vladimir Putin's Russia and the End of Revolution'. 2005, New York: Simon&Schuster. pp. 52-53.

There're lots of cases in the first decade of XXI century in Russia, which could be used as an example of the political struggle between elites leading to a transformation of the regime, that's why I've decided to use the following list of events in Russia's recent history, because their analysis helps us to describe the important aspects of the political transformation:

- the 'NTV case'
- the 'Yukos case'
- the abolition of governors' elections

- the transition from the mixed voting system in Duma's election to proportional voting system and the alteration of the law concerning political parties in Russian Federation

- the increase of the Presidential term from 4 to 6 years

We'll start in chronological order, the first event - the NTV case happened in 2001, after the split in the ruling elite occurred. The oligarchs became uneasy with the growth of the influence of the siloviki¹¹² group, so the oligarchs took a preemptive action against their former friends - they've started an informational war on controlled channels against the protector of the siloviki - Vladimir Putin. Vladimir Gusinskiy the owner of the NTV channel was one of the main opponents of the President¹¹³, the NTV channel began criticizing Putin's governance and his 'friends'. The reaction of the ruling elite was swift: the elite using the Gazprom-Media company, which held 46% of the NTV stock, decided to take control over the channel. Using the loans, which were taken in the 90s, and with help of Capital R&M company, Gazprom-media had managed to gather 50,5% of the stock, which allowed to hold the grip. The NTV's personnel with the help of a counter-elite (a

¹¹² 'Russia: Expert Eyes Security Ties Among Siloviki: interview with Olga Kryshstanovskaya', Radio Liberty, 20 december 2006, [Online], < <http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1073593.html> >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

¹¹³ 'Gusinsky - Thorn in Putin's side.', BBC News, 16 June 2000, [Online], < <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/794339.stm> >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

political opposition) organized rallies against the "seizure of NTV channel", which resulted in Putin's invitation of the NTV's personnel on a meeting. Still during a meeting the president denied all the accusations of "the government taking over the channel and called the conflict a "dispute between economic entities"¹¹⁴. Soon the old personnel left the channel and the new pro-presidential group took over the NTV. The "NTV case" was the first, but not the last, soon after the channels that were in opposition to Vladimir Putin were closer or became loyal and "unofficially" controlled¹¹⁵. The NTV case began a fall of the oligarchs as a centralized group, and a subjugation of the oligarchs which had any political ambitions.

The "Yukos case" is yet another case of the elite taking over its rivals: Mikhail Khodorkovsky (the head of the Yukos company) was a part of the oligarchs, however he had his own political interests - he had been financially supportive for opposition's needs¹¹⁶.

As the siloviki were taking over the oligarchs' assets, such a tidbit on the oil market couldn't had gone unnoticed. The elite's interest in the oil market was cultivated by the Putin's old friend Igor Sechin¹¹⁷ (the siloviki group), he was a Deputy Chief of the Presidential Administration in that moment (soon after the end of the Rosneft's takeover of Yukos he'll enter the board of the directors of Rosneft, currently he's a CEO of the Rosneft company¹¹⁸).

¹¹⁴ Rostova Natalia., 'Leading daily falls victim to pre-election media war.', Gazeta.ru, 21 February 2003, [Online], < <http://www.gazeta.ru/2003/02/21/Leadingdaily.shtml> >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

¹¹⁵ 'Surveillance in Russia in 2012', Reporters without borders, 12 March 2012, [Online] < <http://en.rsf.org/russia-russia-12-03-2012,42075.html> >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

¹¹⁶ Amsterdam Robert., 'CONSTITUTIONAL AND DUE PROCESS VIOLATIONS IN THE KHODORKOVSKY/YUKOS CASE: A WHITE PAPER PREPARED BY DEFENSE LAWYERS ON BEHALF OF MIKHAIL KHODORKOVSKY PLATON LEBEDEV ALEXEI PICHUGIN ', [Online], < http://www.old.khodorkovsky.info/docs/133826__Download_the_YUKOS_White_Paper.pdf >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

¹¹⁷ Pavlovsky Gleb., 'The Unraveling: The Tandem's Slow Death', Radio Liberty, 19 May 2013, [Online], < http://www.rferl.org/content/how_the_tandem_disintegrated/24535389.html >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

¹¹⁸ 'Igor Sechin - President of Rosneft, Chairman of Rosneft's Management Board.', ROSNEFT, [Online], < <http://www.rosneft.com/about/management/igor-sechin/> >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

The Yukos company was a tasty morsel, it was the fastest growing company on the market with great perspectives in the near future¹¹⁹. In 2003 Mikhail Khodorkovsky decided to merge the company with Sibneft, which would have created one of the biggest and most powerful oil companies in the world¹²⁰.

Khodorkovsky's bold political behavior¹²¹ made him one of the most hated Putin's enemies, the Yukos company and Khodorkovsky were on the collision course with the elite. Soon the "Yukos case" started: without a shadow of doubt the judge declared Mikhail guilty, his companions and friends were either sentenced to jail or fled from Russia, the Yukos stock fell drastically, and then were bought for 10000 rubles on a secondary market¹²². The ruling elite managed to kill two birds with one stone - it eliminated the serious political opponent with great economic assets and took over the biggest and fastest-growing oil company, starting the takeover of the whole market. The oligarchs as an elite faction were completely defeated.

During the Yukos case the ruling elite had seen the potential threat to itself - an opposition to the government, a counter-elite wasn't satisfied with the previous persecutions, the ruling elite had implemented and was preparing to a conflict. First signs of the opposition's activity were seen during the NTV case, - an immigration of Boris Berezovsky hadn't caused the unification of the counter-elite

¹¹⁹ 'Yukos Oil Company Verdict: European Court of Human Rights Decision to be Released on 20 September 2011', The YUKOS Library, 13 September 2011, [Online],

< <http://www.theyukoslibrary.com/en/news/statements/yukos-oil-company-verdict-european-court-of-human-rights-decision-to-be-released-on-20-september-2011/> >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

¹²⁰ 'YUKOS/Sibneft Corporate Governance - Risk Increased', Troika Dialog, 2 April 2004, [Online],

< http://ir.gazprom-neft.ru/fileadmin/user_upload/documents/troika-2004-04-02-eng.pdf >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

¹²¹ Remnick David., 'Gulag Lite', The New Yorker, 20 December 2010, [Online],

< http://www.newyorker.com/talk/comment/2010/12/20/101220taco_talk_remnick >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

¹²² Wheeler C., Macalister T.: 'Oil price soars to 21-year high as Yukos production shutdown looms', The Guardian, 29 July 2004, [Online],

< <http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2004/jul/29/oilandpetrol.russia> >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

against the ruling elite, but a direct attack on the media served as an alarm to those who were discontented with Putin and his elite¹²³.

The ruling elite took a decision to marginalize the opposition¹²⁴, in order to drive them out from a legal field of action. Another important task for the elite was to consolidate its power, to suppress the regional elites, which had their own interests and had a potential to threaten the authority's positions on two fields - in the Federal Assembly (the State Duma and the Federation Council) and in the regions directly.

The 2004 is the year of the institutional change in Russia, Putin decided to increase the federal influence in regions and finally to transform the State Duma into a place that 'isn't a suited for discussions'¹²⁵.

The first goal was to rein the regional elites, because some of them weren't loyal to the federal centre, and some of them had own political ambitions (for example, in the third term Duma in 1999-2003's there was a political bloc 'Fatherland - All Russia' which represented the will of the regional governors¹²⁶, it was later silently 'conquered' and became a part of the United Russia, the deputies were incorporated into the ruling elite). To embed the regional governors into the 'power vertical' Putin's elite decided to pass a bill granting the President a right to appoint the governors¹²⁷. The appointed governors became a continuation of the federal authorities' will in regions.

¹²³ '20,000 Turn Out in Support of NTV', The Moscow Times, 2 April 2001, p.3, [Online],

< <http://www.eng.yabloko.ru/Publ/2001/Papers/mtimes-020401.html> >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

¹²⁴ 'Violated Rights: the 2013 World Report by Human Rights Watch', Institute of Modern Russia, [Online], < <http://imrussia.org/en/society/385-violated-rights-the-2013-world-report-2013-by-human-rights-watch> >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

¹²⁵ 'Vladimir Putin's backer Boris Gryzlov quits as Speaker', The Australian News, [Online], < <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/vladimir-putins-backer-boris-gryzlov-quits-as-speaker/story-e6frg6so-122622333374> >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

¹²⁶ Smyth Regina., 'Power as Patronage: Russian Parties and Russian Democracy', PONARS Policy Memo 106, February 2000, [Online],

< http://www.ponarseurasia.org/sites/default/files/policy-memos-pdf/pm_0106.pdf >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

¹²⁷ Baker Peter., 'Putin Moves to Centralize Authority', Washington Post Foreign Service, 14 September 2004, Page A01, [Online],

However, there still was a possibility of the regional politicians winning the elections through the majority voting part of the mixed voting system and passing into the Duma. The Kremlin decided to remove the possible threat to the stability in the Parliament - the voting system was reformed into a proportional one, leaving not loyal political activists and politician behind, also the law concerning the political parties was reformed: to register a political party in Russia organizers needed at least 50000 of supporters, political slates were forbidden, also the parties were bound to the government by financial instruments¹²⁸.

The elite had secured the political field, and the only institute in which the popular vote remained was the president, but there was no threat in it, because Vladimir Putin had an overwhelming popularity among the Russians - he had a landslide victory on the Presidential elections in 2004¹²⁹ with 71,31% in the first tour.

Still there was another serious problem, that the elite faced in the end of the second Putin's term: Vladimir Putin was a leader of the elite, the coordinator, the one whose popularity gave the legitimacy to a current political elite, also it might be speculated that Vladimir Putin had his own reasons to remain in power. So the problem of the short Presidential term was solved in a very 'elegant' way.

Dmitry Medvedev became the third president of Russia in 2008, his discourse was quite democratic and liberal, though his governance was not¹³⁰, because Mr. Putin stayed in power, changing the title from the "president of Russia" to "Prime-Minister". The centre of the political power remained the same because of the theatric nature of the castling . Dmitry Medvedev was considered to be the in-

< <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A17838-2004Sep13.html> >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

¹²⁸ 'Federal Law on Political Parties with the amendments', Garant law portal, [Online], Russian source,

< <http://base.garant.ru/183523/7/> >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

¹²⁹ '2004 presidential election, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 14 March 2004 , [Online],

< <http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/russia/33101> >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

¹³⁰ 'World report: Events of 2009', Human Rights Watch, , p.429-431, [Online],

< <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/wr2010.pdf> >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

between terms President¹³¹, though a problem was weighted on his shoulders - he had to solve the problem of the "insufficient 4 years term". The Constitution of the Russian Federation demands a referendum in some serious changes are needed to be implemented, however in 2008 Russia have "evaded" that requirement - State Duma (United Russia had a constitutional majority) managed to vote for the enlargement of the presidential term not rising any social awareness . Finally, in 2012 when Putin officially returned to the presidential position - he had 6 years' term.

So, by the end of the 2000s, the political elite and its leader Vladimir Putin had secured their positions: they'd survived an inner schism and banished, subjugated or jailed the oligarchs, after that they casted out the counter-elite, leaving them no instruments to be legally represented, and the 'power vertical' was built in order to subjugate the regional elites. Since their 'flanks' were secured, they decided to ensure their future through the increase of the Presidential term and a political castling.

The ruling elite in Russia is rather cunning, their behavior is aggressive, non-competitive; the elite has thinks in strategic terms trying to secure its future. The political elite took a set of measures, reformed the political regime transforming it into a non-competitive and semi-democratic system.

There are different points of view towards the results of that political transformation: liberal political scientists¹³² suggest that the political regime is non-

¹³¹ Benvenuti Francesco., ' "Castling": Medvedev and Putin change places', EuroPressResearch, October 2011, [Online], p.3,

< <http://www.euopressresearch.eu/upload/pdf/PDF.%20FOCUS%20ING%20Ottobre%2011%20-%20BENVENUTI.pdf> >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

¹³² Urnov Mark., 'The role of culture in democratic transition', Liberal arts and Modernity, 2011, № 6, pp. 5-17, [Online],

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<http://www.hse.ru/pubs/lib/data/access/ticket/136899508261fdb9b8a24e8c5d656f9a7927eec581/%D0%A3%D1%80%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%B2%20%D0%A0%D0%BE%D0%BB%D1%8C%20%D0%BA%D1%83%D0%BB%D1%8C%D1%82%D1%83%D1%80%D1%8B%20%D0%B2%20%D0%B4%D0%B5%D0%BC%D0%BE%D0%BA%D1%80%D0%B0%D1%82%D0%B8%D1%87%D0%B5%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%BC%20%D1%82%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B7%D0%B8%D1%82%D0%B5%202.pdf> >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

democratic, pro-Kremlin political scientists oppose them¹³³. And for a scientist it is quite hard to abstain from the evaluation of the contemporary political system, however I have to express my opinion - an authoritarian transition is taking place in contemporary Russia because of the actions taken by the ruling elite.

An authoritarian transition is a process opposite to a democratic transition - the transformation process of a current political system into an authoritarian regime.

The curtailment of fundamental rights¹³⁴, the violation of democratic procedures¹³⁵, the governmental intervention into the market¹³⁶, the gathering of all the authority in hands of self-perpetuating elite, the elimination of political adversaries - are the main distinctive features and the results of the authoritarian transition.

In this part of the research we studied a process of political transformation in contemporary Russia. We discovered the leading reason for the reformation of political system in Russia and examined the most important milestones of that process.

We came to the conclusion that the process of transformation could be described as an authoritarian one, that fact gives us an understanding why the EU has a 'legitimate' reason for its application of normative power towards Russia.

¹³³ Danilin Pavel., 'The President's new formula: the restoration of conservative consensus is underway', Russian Newspaper, 14.08.2012, [Online],

< <http://www.rg.ru/2012/08/14/formula.html> >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

¹³⁴ 'World Report 2012: Russia', Human Rights Watch, [Online],

< <http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2012/world-report-2012-russia> >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

¹³⁵ Bardin Jon, 'Statistical model suggests widespread fraud in Russian election', Los Angeles Times, 24 September 2012, [Online],

< <http://articles.latimes.com/2012/sep/24/science/la-sci-sn-statistical-model-suggests-fraud-in-russian-election-20120924> >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

¹³⁶ Kimer James., 'More Intervention and Higher Tariffs in Russia's Economy', Robert Amsterdam: perspectives on Global Politics and business, 7 Paril 2008, [Online],

< http://robertamsterdam.com/2008/04/more_intervention_and_higher_tariffs_in_russias_economy/ >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

3.2 The efficiency of the EU's normative power application in the Russia-EU relations.

In the previous parts of the research we've accomplished the following goals:

- We've applied the liberal intergovernmental theory to comprehend the nature of the European Union, its characteristics as a consensus of the member-states.

- We've applied the neorealist theoretical framework to international relations and described the interest-driven behavior of Russia and the EU in contemporary world politics, using neorealist definitions.

- We've analyzed the political transformation in contemporary Russia using the elitist theory and have revealed the fact that the political transformation is the result of struggle between elites.

So, now we are ready to find the place of normative power in these relations. In order to achieve this goal we'll need to look through the history of the relations: we'll study the cases and try to measure the efficiency of EU's normative power and a rise of tensions caused by an application of normative power.

As we've stated before - the process taking place in contemporary Russia can't be described as a democratic one, so for the European Union relying on normative power it is a great opportunity to apply normative instruments in order to lay pressure on the Russian Federation.

The cases to be analyzed are the following: the First Chechen War, The Second Chechen Conflict, the Yukos case, the reaction to the assassination of Anna Politkovskaya.

- the First Chechen War. The First Chechen War occurred before the authoritarian transition in Russia, so it would be a good case to compare the others with.

- the Second Chechen War, which is usually named a 'counter-terrorist operation in Chechnya' in Russian sources¹³⁷). This case allows us to compare Russia's behavior in response to EU's use of normative power after the Vladimir Putin's rise to power.

- the Yukos case will connect one of the most important points in contemporary Russia's history of political transformation with the EU's reaction to it.

- the adoption of amendments to the NGO-law in 2006 as an example of Russia's internal transformation influencing the world politics.

- the reaction to the assassination of Anna Politkovskaya is an example of influence of EU's normative power in the late process of Russia's political transformation.

During the 90s Russia was considered to be weak in international relations, after the dissolution of the USSR: the Russian Army was in the terrible condition, the economic system was in the state of rebuilding.

During the time of Russia's weakness the European Union had a 'golden age' after a ratification of the Maastricht Treaty: the EU's economic strength was incredible in comparison with the post-soviet Russia's¹³⁸. Russia was dependant on Europe, because it was interested in the development of its own economy.

¹³⁷ ' Russia 'ends Chechnya operation' ', BBC News, 16 April 2009, [Online],

< <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8001495.stm> >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

¹³⁸ Mandelson Peter., 'The EU and Russia: our joint political challenge', Speech in Bologna, 20 April 2007, p.3., [Online], < http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2007/april/tradoc_134524.pdf >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

The Russian government wasn't ready for the parade of sovereignties' scope, the Chechnya's pursuit for independency, sovereignty was a direct threat to a territorial integrity of Russia¹³⁹, so the war between the Chechen separatists and the Russian army erupted.

The EU was shocked by a turn of events, because the EU underestimated Russia and Eltsin's adherence to the force in politics¹⁴⁰. Russia started a war in the middle of the negotiations on Partnership and Cooperation Agreement: an Agreement that had to become a fundament of future Russia-EU relations, Russia endangered an idea of strategic partnership itself. From the neorealist point of view it isn't strange that the state prefers its sovereignty to opinions of other actors.

The European Union froze the negotiations until the warfare in Chechnya was over, and the Council of the EU made a statement that a cease fire is needed; the Council also stressed Russia's status as a major partner of the EU¹⁴¹. Soon EU's main institutions agreed that the most important goal was to end the violence. The first cease fire was signed between Russia and Chechnya in 1995, and the second one in 1996. Still Russia stopped the warfare in 1996 not because of the EU's pressure, but because of internal political process - the Presidential elections of 1996 were crucial for a future of the country, and the Chechen war was unpopular between the population, so the decision was taken to stop the warfare, at least for a short period of time.

Russia's disregard of EU's rules of the game and neglect for the signing of a major agreement with the most important trade partner in the first part of the war

¹³⁹ Rubin Trudy., ' Kozyrev Excuses Role In Chechnya', The Philadelphia Inquirer, 3 February 1995, [Online], < http://articles.philly.com/1995-02-03/news/25706002_1_chechnya-russian-democracy-chechen-war >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

¹⁴⁰ Morrissette Jason., ' Rationality and risk-taking in Russia's first Chechen War: toward a theory of cognitive realism', European Political Science Review / Volume 2 / Issue 02 / July 2010, pp 187 - 210, [Online], < <http://cjo-live.cup.cam.ac.uk/action/displayFulltext?type=1&fid=7816533&jid=EPR&volumeld=2&issuelid=02&aid=7816531> >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

¹⁴¹ Johnson D., Robinson P.: ' Perspectives on EU-Russia Relations', 07 March 2013, pp. 112-120, [Online], < http://books.google.ru/books?id=HyZPjFXBwjAC&dq=the+first+chechen+war+EU+actions&hl=ru&source=gbs_navlinks_s >, >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

and a primacy of internal political process give us an understanding, that even being weak on the international arena, Russia was 'egocentric' and ready to ignore anyone who would try to affect the internal political process.

The Chechen conflict was temporarily frozen, but it was far from the end in 1996, until Chechnya had a sovereignty - Russia's territorial sovereignty (as a part of the whole concept of sovereignty) was questioned.

In July 1999, the European Council met in Helsinki in order to adopt the Millennium Declaration, and a separate declaration was adopted concerning the Chechen Conflict: the EU confirmed its respect for a territorial unity of Russia, it condemned the terrorists, and called upon the sides to respect the humanitarian law, however the most important was the 8th paragraph:

*Russia is a major partner for the European Union. The Union has constantly expressed its willingness to accompany Russia in its transition towards a modern and democratic state. But Russia must live up to its obligations if the strategic partnership is to be developed. The European Union does not want Russia to isolate herself from Europe*¹⁴². (c)

However, these EU's constant public political statements couldn't have stopped the Second Chechen War: in August 1999 a Chechen Islamic Terrorist group started an offense on Russian territory of Dagestan giving Russian military a "cause" to invade Chechnya¹⁴³.

Russia positioned the second conflict in Chechnya as a counter-terrorist operation adhering to the principle of territorial sovereignty; it wasn't a war

¹⁴² 'PRESIDENCY CONCLUSIONS: HELSINKI EUROPEAN COUNCIL 10 AND 11 DECEMBER 1999: DECLARATION ON CHECHNYA', The European Council, 10-11 December 1991, [Online], < http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/ACFA4C.htm >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

¹⁴³ 'Effect of Dagestan invasion was similar to 9/11', Russia Today, 7 August 2009, [Online], < <http://rt.com/news/effect-dagestan-invasion/> >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

between Russia and Chechnya, it was a conflict of Russia and terrorists which resided in Chechnya.

Russia's offensive was quick and disastrous - Russia had heavily relied on artillery, which resulted in thousands of killed Chechens¹⁴⁴. The fact of the new war against Chechnya couldn't have gone unnoticed by the EU.

European Parliament adopted a resolution on war in which it condemned the violation of human rights, also the economic measures were applied¹⁴⁵: EU suspended the consideration of extension of the Generalized System of Preferences for Russia and frozen the signature process of the Scientific and Technological Agreement. Also a slight reduction of the import quotas was applied for Russian steel on the European market.

However, the effect of public obstruction from the EU countries and their leaders was minimal - Russia, represented by the new President Vladimir Putin stood on one's ground¹⁴⁶. EU's leaders attempts to interpret the conflict as a matter as an international matter failed - Russia had successfully defended its agenda against other actors in international relations¹⁴⁷.

The EU's failure with an attempt to rule the agenda could also be proved by a change of EU's discourse after the 10th Russia-EU summit, where the Second Chechen Conflict was withdrawn from the agenda¹⁴⁸.

¹⁴⁴ 'Casualties officially announced since the beginning of the Chechen conflict', Prague Watchdog, 13 September 2000, [Online],

< <http://www.watchdog.cz/index.php?show=000000-000005-000003-000001&lang=1> >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

¹⁴⁵ Portela Clara., 'European Union Sanctions and Foreign Policy: When and why Do They Work?', Routledge, 2010, p. 112-115, [Online]

< <http://goo.gl/WtHNj> >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

¹⁴⁶ Wijngaert Vanden Geert., ' Putin Defends Chechen War to EU', The Associated Press, 12 November 2002, [Online], < <http://goo.gl/6qBXi> >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

¹⁴⁷ ' Putin defends Chechen campaign', BBC News, 29 January 2000, [Online], < <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/623006.stm> >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

¹⁴⁸ h Portela Clara., 'European Union Sanctions and Foreign Policy: When and why Do They Work?', Routledge, 2010, p. 115, [Online]

< <http://goo.gl/WtHNj> >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

The Second Chechen War had also showed Russia didn't want to listen to the European Parliament. We can state that Russia disregarded Parliament's point of view - Vladimir Putin prefers to speak with others leaders, however he doesn't heed the parliamentarians' declaration because they have no power in his eyes. Russia prefers to speak with the equal partners, and the EU's Parliament isn't considered to be one of them.

The European Union is still concerned with the situation in Chechnya¹⁴⁹ after the end of the military operation and periodically tries to raise that theme in discussions with the Russian side, however any mention of Chechnya makes Russia nervous. EU only worsens the relations by talking about the problem from Russia's point of view, though since the end of the Second Chechen War the frequency of references of it had decreased, EU started promoting an agenda of post-war human rights situation in Chechnya, EU's support of NGOs (for example Amnesty International which investigates the vanishing of human rights activists and fights for the rights of political prisoners in Chechnya and neighbor regions of the North Caucasus) that are working in Chechnya causes Russia to fight NGOs using internal law. Since EU's highest representatives don't discuss that problem with Russian highest official, we could say that the problem of human rights in Chechnya isn't crucial in Russia-EU relations anymore, however the tension hasn't perished it has changed the level of confrontation, letting the EU and Russia to concentrate on the other problems.

The Second Chechen War had an unexpected result for the Russian government - it uplifted an independent journalism¹⁵⁰. Many people started their careers during the Chechen conflicts. Anna Politkovskaya was one of the many

¹⁴⁹ ' 12 Years of Humanitarian Aid for Chechnya', The European Commission: Humanitarian Aid & Civil Protection, 2011, [Online],

< http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/2011_chechnya_factsheet_en.pdf >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

¹⁵⁰ Maksakov Ilya., ' Russian journalists in the second war in Chechnya', Prague Watchdog, 12 September 2002, [Online],

< <http://www.watchdog.cz/?show=000000-000003-000002-000016&lang=1> >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

journalists, human rights activists, she was seriously concerned with the situation in Chechnya¹⁵¹: the violation of the basic human rights, the kill of the innocent, the atrocities committed by the both sides of the conflict. She published worldwide known books about Putin's regime and its crimes in Chechnya¹⁵², she visited refugee camps near Chechnya and was a dedicated opponent of the regime that had committed numerous crimes against the freedom.

She was killed on the 7th of October in 2006, in the elevator in her apartment's elevator. Her assassination is usually associated with the "Chechen trace", the week before her death she gave an interview to a radio, in which she told, that she had some information concerning the murder committed on behalf of pro-putinist leader of Chechnya (prime-minister of the republic) - Ramzan Kadyrov¹⁵³. The stability in Chechnya was one of the top-priority tasks for Putin, and Kadyrov's governance was one of the most cruel and autocratic in Chechnya (kidnapping of Kadyrov's political opponents was a frequent practice¹⁵⁴), that's why many believe that murder had a political background and was ordered by Putin himself. EU's reaction was swift: the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Finland held the Presidency of the EU Council) "...on behalf of the Presidency called for a thorough investigation of this heinous crime and the bringing of its perpetrators to justice. On behalf of the European Union, the Presidency expresses its deepest sympathy to the family and friends of Anna Politkovskaya."¹⁵⁵

¹⁵¹ Borchgrevink Aage., 'The Silencing of Human Rights Defenders in Chechnya and Ingushetia', International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, 15 September 2004, [Online],

< http://www.srji.org/files/ihf_silencing.pdf >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

¹⁵² Politkovskaya Anna., 'A condemned woman', The Guardian, 14 October 2006, [Online],

< <http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2006/oct/14/featuresreviews.guardianreview2> >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

¹⁵³ 'Russia: Anna Politkovskaya's Last Interview', Radio Liberty, 9 October 2006,

< <http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1071908.html> >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

¹⁵⁴ MICHAEL SCHWIRTZ., 'Russian Rights Activist Cleared of Defamation', The New York Times, 14 June 2011., [Online],

< <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/15/world/europe/15chechnya.html> >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

¹⁵⁵ 'EU Presidency Statement on the killing of Anna Politkovskaya', The Presidency of the European Union: The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, 10 October 2006, [Online], <

<http://www.formin.fi/Public/default.aspx?contentid=81692&nodeid=15145&contentlan=2&culture=en-US> >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

Still Russian political elite wasn't really interested in the investigation, and the EU's public political pressure on the investigation made the Kremlin reclusive in its commentaries, thought later Russian officials and pro-Kremlin political journalists started commenting on the theories in which the murder was committed by the political opposition, or even pro-western supporters to start anti-governmental hysteria¹⁵⁶. The political elite was irritated, we must admit that the elimination of the dangerous and popular political critic would benefit Chechnya's leader Kadyrov and guarantee the stability in the region, also it would might secure the behavior of human rights activists in Russia.

Time passed by but neither adequate results in the investigation were made and published, nor serious accusations against the killers were made, the European Union had started becoming impatient: political representatives of the EU had questioned the Russian side about the progress¹⁵⁷, receiving no clear answer¹⁵⁸. European Parliament had also been politically active¹⁵⁹, it published resolutions in which he urged to hurry the investigation. The results, however, were modest¹⁶⁰.

There are lots of similar examples in Russia's recent history when political activists, journalists, businessmen and others disappear, get killed or die in Russian jails: the Magnitsky case¹⁶¹, the case of Zarema Sadulayeva and her husband Alik

¹⁵⁶ Torocheshnikova Mariana., ' Karaulov sides with Putin and Sechin', Radio Svoboda, 16 March 2011, [Online] - Russian source, < <http://www.svoboda.org/content/article/2340552.html> >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

¹⁵⁷ ' EU QUESTIONS POLITKOVSKAYA INVESTIGATION', The St. Petersburg Times, 16 October 2006, [Online], < http://sptimes.ru/index.php?action_id=2&story_id=19171 >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

¹⁵⁸ ' The European Union – Russian Federation human rights consultations', Council of the European Union, 10 December 2012 A 566/12, [Online], < http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/134146.pdf >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

¹⁵⁹ ' Antall, Brandt, Adenauer and Politkovskaya honoured by Parliament', The European Parliament, 28 January 2008, [Online], < <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+IM-PRESS+20080121STO19280+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN> >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

¹⁶⁰ The assassination was solved on 14th December, the killer Dmitry Pavluchenko has confessed the commitment of the murder. In my opinion, that's an attempt to close the criminal case, because the case still has a lots of unanswered questions like the FSB's surveillance on Politkovskaya before her death.

¹⁶¹ Ashton Catherine., ' Statement by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton on the Magnitsky case in the Russian Federation', The Council of the European Union, Brussels, 20 March 2013 A 154/13, [Online], < http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/136361.pdf >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

Dzhabrailov and other similar cases¹⁶². However, despite all the declarations the European Parliament published, all the High Representative's statements¹⁶³, the EU's President's speeches¹⁶⁴ Russian political course doesn't change much. Only an irritation of Russia's leaders could be achieved through the reminder of human rights situation in Russia¹⁶⁵.

The next example is the Yukos case, it is quite important from my point of view to use it the second time in the research: it helps us to understand the connection between the internal policy and foreign affairs in the Russian Federation, also that case plays a notable role in the relations between the EU and Russia, we are able to study the case's impact on the relations.

There were several reasons for the EU to get involved into the case: the Yukos company was a major economic player on Russia's market, it was a competitive company trying to become one of the world largest players in the oil market and the EU as a major importer of Russian materials had an interest in the development of Russian oil market; Khodorkovsky's sentence seemed as a manifestation of Russia's authoritarian tendencies.

During the time Khodorkovsky was sentenced, the Russia-EU relations were on the rise, both sides agreed to create in the future the four 'Common Spaces' - a

¹⁶² 'Resolution of the EU Parliament: Murder of human rights activists in Russia', The European Parliament, 17 September 2009, [Online],

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<http://www.euoparl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/200909/20090923ATT61108/20090923ATT61108EN.pdf> >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

¹⁶³ Ashton Catherine., 'by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton on the political use of justice in Russia European Parliament/Strasbourg 11 September 2012', the European Commission, 11 September 2012, [Online] < http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-12-598_en.htm?locale=FR>, [accessed 19 May 2013]

¹⁶⁴ Rettman Andrew., 'EU president: Magnitsky case is 'emblematic' for Russia', The EU Observer, 20.04.12, [Online],

< <http://euobserver.com/magnitsky/115968> >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

¹⁶⁵ 'EU-Russian talks end in acrimony', BBC News, 18 May 2007, [Online],

< <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6668111.stm>>, [accessed 19 May 2013]

declarative program enhancing their relations¹⁶⁶. The Yukos case could have threatened the thaw in contemporary relations.

The EU was ready to lay pressure on Russia during the summit about the political motives of the case¹⁶⁷, the European Commission was especially skeptic towards Russia. However, Russia had successfully played the card of an Italian Presidency in the Council of the EU, and it messed up the EU's plans to lay pressure on Vladimir Putin. Silvio Berlusconi, the prime minister of Italia, an old friend of Vladimir Putin, defended Russia's point of view, stating: "I'm acting as President Putin's defense lawyer here, even though he hasn't asked me to(c)¹⁶⁸". He stood against the idea that Yukos case had any political background. Putin used the same discourse in defense of Russia's position.

The agenda of the summit was swayed, Russia managed to evade the application of normative power using the EU's 'structural weakness'. In the joint statement of the 12th Russian-EU summit there was no mentions of Khodorkovsky or Yukos¹⁶⁹. We can make a conclusion, that Russia won the EU in that case.

Nonetheless, the Russia-EU relations deteriorated after the Yukos case, because the problem wasn't solved on the summit. The EU continued its attempts to raise the awareness of the Yukos case: the European Parliament proceeded to the public discussions concerning the Yukos case¹⁷⁰ and still tries to put the question on the agenda of the Russia-EU's relations.

¹⁶⁶ 'EU-Russia Common Spaces', European Union External Action web-site, [Online],

< http://eeas.europa.eu/russia/common_spaces/index_en.htm >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

¹⁶⁷ 'Russia Yukos Chief Charged With Tax Evasion, Fraud', PressCentre for defence attorneys of Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Platon Lebedev, 25 October 2003, [Online],

< <http://www.old.khodorkovsky.info/trial/arrest/133764.html> >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

¹⁶⁸ 'Putin vows to combat corruption', BBC News, 6 November 2003, [Online],

< <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3247865.stm> >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

¹⁶⁹ '12th EU-RUSSIA SUMMIT', The Council of European Union, 6 November 2003 13990/03 (Presse 313) , [Online],

< http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/77845.pdf >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

¹⁷⁰ 'Human Rights Subcommittee discusses Russian Khodorkovsky case', The European Parliament, 11 January 2011, [Online],

< <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/content/20110110STO11394/html/Human-Rights-Subcommittee-discusses-Russian-Khodorkovsky-case> >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

The second round of the Yukos case influence on the relations started in 2010, when the new charges against Khodorkovsky were brought, he was convicted and his sentence was prolonged. The High Representative Catherine Ashton was the voice of the EU during the prosecution, she noted that the EU closely follows the case and will raise the theme on the next Russia-EU summit. She emphasized the importance of the rule of the law in Russia in her official statement¹⁷¹, obviously making a reference to the Partnership for Modernization program, that was a flagman program in Russia-EU bilateral relations since 2010.

Despite the constant reminders from the EU's representatives, concerning the Yukos case, Mikhail Khodorkovsky is still in prison. The EU's attempts to lay pressure on Russia using normative powers were unsuccessful, moreover Russia continued to fend off the EU's normative rhetoric, stating the case was a Russian internal affair, so the Russian judiciary system was in control of it, and nobody, even the President couldn't influence the prosecution¹⁷².

The normative dimensions of Russia-EU relations is quite complicated - Russia tends to take a defensive stance, while the EU constantly tries to attack Russia on internal matters. These cases give us an understanding that the relations are approaching a potential deadlock: the commitment of the EU to use normative power is remarkable, and the efficiency of it is incredible small; but every time the EU puts some pressure on Russia - Russia gets more irritated; relations are deteriorating with each application of normative power.

¹⁷¹ Ashton Catherine., 'Statement by High Representative Catherine Ashton on Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Platon Lebedev case', The Council of European Union, 24 May 2011 A 204/11, [Online], < http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/122199.pdf >, [accessed 19 May 2013]

¹⁷² Loiko Sergei., 'Khodorkovsky found guilty in second trial, could face more prison time', Los Angeles Times, 28 December 2010, [Online], < <http://articles.latimes.com/2010/dec/28/world/la-fg-russia-tycoon-20101228>>, [accessed 19 May 2013]

The normative factor concerning the Russia's authoritarian transition in contemporary relations holds an important place in Russia-EU relations, the potential of stagnation and deadlock in relations caused by it mustn't be ignored.

3.3 The role of normative power in the dialogue between the EU and Russia.

From the data conducted from the cases below, we can draw the following conclusions concerning the efficiency of the EU's normative power application towards Russia:

- Russia's soft power isn't developed enough to stand against other actors, relying on their soft power, and Russia is well aware of that weakness. The understanding of potential vulnerability to soft power on the world scene is the main reason Russia is trying to avoid any attempts of other actors to influence the decision making process in Russia. Russia deflects all the attempts with her sovereignty: either Russian politicians refer to the territorial unity principle or the internal nature of the processes occurring in its borders.

- However, the European Union can't stop laying pressure on Russia, despite the previous failures. If the EU stops, then Russia wins - it is a game with a zero sum. A possible refusal of the EU to apply normative power in Russian case will have drastic consequences for it - the EU will start losing its image of a regional power, further weakening itself in international relations. Nonetheless, the authoritarian regime still exists in Russia, so the European Union has a convenient cause to lay pressure on Russia.

- Also, the European Parliament can't be stopped if it decides to condemn any situation in Russia, because it doesn't depend on the member-states. The European Parliament despite its very active position in the EU's public diplomacy has no notable influence in the relations between Russia and the EU, because Russia doesn't pay 'enough' attention to the Parliament's political actions; by doing so Russia diminishes the European Parliament's role in the relations.

The relations between the EU and Russia have a variety of other aspects, the application of normative power in these relations won't fade away, even if it is not efficient, however a certain collateral effect of normative power use exists: Russia gets irritated when the EU's normative pressure is hard. The more Russia gets irritated, the harder the reaction might be the next time: each time the EU attempts to use normative power - the relations become more strained.

It is not a stumbling block in contemporary relations, but the potential of its escalation is serious - in the game with a zero sum both sides know that they can't lose; both sides can't show their weakness - the relations are moving straight forward a deadlock, the only question is a pace of this movement.

My recommendation is the following: the European Union needs to reduce the pressure on Russia in a normative dimension of relations, if the EU wishes to continue the development of these relations: the EU doesn't have to 'cut' its normative power, but pressure must be weakened. I recommend an 'agree to disagree' attitude: Russia and the EU agree on their differences, they stop the escalation of the potential conflict, and focus on other pressing matters.

I expect that the application of the 'agree to disagree' attitude will have a positive effect on the relations, because the dialogue will be more constructive. I must admit, that I don't believe in potential breakthroughs in the relations in the near future, caused by the change in application of normative power by the EU, because at the moment there are other serious issues in the relations.

Nonetheless, the sides should put more attention to other aspects of relations, if both actors follow the recommendation - they'll be able to avoid the deadlock, caused by the normative power application in relations, until Russia turns away from its internal political course or the EU enhances its strength on the world scene with other types of power.

4. Conclusions.

The research has shown the impact of EU's normative power on Russia-EU relations, it has also provided us with a solid amount of data to make a recommendation for the EU and Russia.

To make conclusions on the results of the study, we'll eventually have to return to the issues raised at the beginning of this paper.

In the first chapter of the of dissertation we applied theoretical frameworks to our models.

We used the liberal intergovernmentalist approach towards the history of the European Union in order to understand the nature of the EU and its motives in foreign affairs - we came to a conclusion that the Union is a consensus between the states concerning the rules of the game inside and outside the EU, it also plays a role of a guardian: the EU institutions oversee and defend integration agreements of the member states both inside and outside the European Union.

Then we explored the theory of world politics using the neorealist approach: we rediscovered an interest-driven behavior of actors in international relations and applied the neorealist methodology to the European Union. We analyzed the strengths and the weaknesses of a power wielded by the EU: a serious lack of military power, combined with a heavy reliance on soft power, we also determined that the EU is predisposed to use normative power.

In the next part we studied Russia's behavior in international relations. We concluded that Russia is an actor committed to hard power, and uncovered Russia's reluctance to use soft power. In foreign affairs the Russian Federation prefers to use a traditional combination of economic and military measures. Russia is a 'hard-nosed' actor - it pursues the goals despite the side effects caused by hard power.

Russia is an actor trying to restore a superpower status: it acts independently and is especially concerned with its influence on post-soviet territories.

In the second chapter of the research we studied the impact of political transition in Russia on the relations between the EU and Russia.

We started the chapter with the research of the phenomenon of political transformation in Russia. We decided to apply the elite theory in order to uncover the root of the authoritarian transition and we concluded that the ruling elite is responsible for the political transition: the political elite is trying to secure its ruling position using all of the available tools including legislative, judicial and executive powers, it is actively changing the political landscape cleansing counter-elites, which results into a non-competitive, authoritarian political system.

In the following part of the research we studied the cases from the history of Russia-EU relations, and identified the place of EU's normative power in the relations. We came to a conclusion that the normative dimension of these relations is a complicated one, because of the obdurate stances taken by the sides: we saw the EU's relentless and inefficient attempts to lay pressure on Russia and an irritation of Russia caused by the EU's behavior.

We measured the impact of EU's normative power on the relations and came to a conclusion, that the hypothesis of EU's normative power based on Russia's internal political transformation as a potential stumbling block in Russia-EU relations was right. Therefore we uncovered that the impact of EU's normative factor on Russia-EU relations is strongly negative.

The realist approach allows us to see, that the influence of the negative factor in these relations should be decreased, if both sides wish to continue deepening the relations. The European Union's commitment to the application of normative power is disadvantageous to the EU itself: the deterioration of the relations leads the EU to the dead end in Russia-EU relations, the EU would only lose if the

strategic long-term partnership with Russia is undermined by the EU's inefficient attempts to lay pressure on 'stubborn' Russia.

These findings gave me enough data to give a recommendation for the EU: the European Union needs to reduce the pressure on Russia in a normative dimension of relations if the EU wishes to improve the relations with Russia, a reduction of normative pressure on Russia would allow the sides to avoid a possible deadlock in the relations. The consequences will have a positive outcome on the relations: the EU won't lose Russia as a strategic partner, the dialogue between Russia and the EU would be less complicated, so the sides will be able to focus on other pressing matters.

It's obvious that the format of dissertation confines the research: the amount of cases could have been bigger, the part about the Russian political transformation itself might have been a distinct dissertation, and the EU's other normative instruments such as the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights and the European Neighborhood Policy could have been studied thoroughly, but facing serious methods restrictions, I've chosen to focus on these cases.

The subject matter of the research still offers a whole set of scientific challenges, despite the uncertainty of Russia-EU relations the topicality of the theme remains - that's the reason I'm certain that an extension of the scientific research that was started in that dissertation is needed.

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